Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 28
Issue 4 October 1995

Article 13

1995

Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: a Post-Cold War
Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old
Embargo Against Cuba
Richard D. Porotsky

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: a Post-Cold War Assessment of the
Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 Vanderbilt Law Review 901
(2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol28/iss4/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Economic Coercion and the General
Assembly: a Post-Cold War

Assessment of the Legality and Utility
of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo
Against Cuba
ABSTRACT

The nature of the conflict between the United States and
Cuba has clearly been changing since the fall of Communism
in Eastern Europe. Deprived of foreign communist subsidies,
Cuba has been forced to begin economic reform. Yet, the
United States has retained its embargo against Cuba. Does
the long-standing embargo violate internationallaw? In an
attempt to answer that question, this Note examines the
status of a norm prohibiting the unilateral use of economic
coercion and whether there has been any post-Cold War
movement toward such a norm.
Over the past thirty years, despite several notable United
Nations resolutions, developing nations failed to establish a
Cuba has
clear norm prohibiting economic coercion.
world
into
attempted to parlay international anger
wake
the
condemnation of alleged U.S. economic coercion in
of U.S. passage of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, which
impacts third party states while clamping down on Cuba.
Indeed, from 1992 to 1994 the U.N. General Assembly
overwhelmingly passed several resolutions critical of the

United States.

However, analysis of the text of the

resolutions and the positions of individual voting members
reveals that there has been little or no movement toward a
norm prohibitingthe use of economic coercion.
Still, there has been increasingpressure on U.S. policy
makers to ease the embargo. Quite simply, as Castro has
begun economic reform, U.S. businesses are growing tired of
watching their internationalcompetitors snap up potentially
lucrative opportunities in Cuba. The lesson appears to be
that, in the post-Cold War era, underdeveloped nations stand
to benefit much more from free trade than from the futile
pursuit of international legal norms concerning economic
coercion.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

For Cuba, the end of the Cold War meant the end of massive
Soviet aid.'
Without Soviet aid and with an economy in dire
straits, Fidel Castro faced an unprecedented scene of political
unrest near a ferry dock in Havana on August 5, 1994.2 A crowd

1.

The U.S. State Department claims that Soviet subsidies to Cuba

ultimately reached $6 billion per year. Alexander F. Watson, Update on U.S. Policy
Toward Cuba, 5 U.S. DEPT ST. DISPATCH 751, 752 (1994) [hereinafter Update1994] (statement by State Department Representative Alexander Watson,
Others
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs on October 8, 1994).
estimate that the aid totalled about $5 billion per year. See Pat M. Holt, The OAS
Should Reconsider Its 1962 Expulsion of Cuba, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 5,
1994, at 19 (authored by former Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee); After Vietnam, Cuba?, ECONOMIST, FEB. 12, 1994, leaders sect., at 17,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
See ProtestersBattle Police in Havana; Castro Warns U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
2.
Aug. 6, 1994, § 1, at 2; see also Michael R. Gordon, Castro's Threat to Unleash
Refugees Brings A Warning By U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994, § 1, at 17. The
unrest is considered the worst since the 1959 Revolution. See Update-1994,
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of 20,000 to 30,000 gathered in anticipation of a ferry hi-jacking
by refugees bound for the United States. 3 Refugees had taken
over at least three other ferries in the previous ten days. 4 In
response to the riots, Castro blamed U.S. policies and threatened

to release a wave of refugees upon Florida, as he had done in the
1980 Mariel boat lift.5 He soon made good on his threat. By midAugust, U.S. officials were straining to cope with the influx of
humanity. 6 Castro then demanded that any immigration talks
include discussion about ending the thirty-three-year-old
7
embargo.
The Clinton Administration, however, announced on August
27, 1994 that immigration talks with Fidel Castro would not
involve easing the embargo. 8 Representative Robert Torricelli (DN.J.), one of the key backers of legislation tightening the embargo,
declared that no U.S. President should even consider reversing a
long-standing policy in response to such a blatant "act of
that
intimidation." 9 The
State Department
emphasized
maintaining the embargo was simply the best way to bring about
the desired change in Cuba, and that any easing of the embargo
Thus, the Clinton
would "delay, not hasten, reform." 10

supranote 1, at 752; see also The Doors Inch Open in Castro's Cuba, ECONOMIsr,
Nov. 19, 1994, at 45.
3.
ProtestersBattle Police.in Havana; Castro Warns U.S., supra note 2
(U.S. State Department crowd estimate).
4.
Gordon, supranote 2.
5.
Id. In the 1980 Mariel exodus, Castro unleashed 120,000 refugees
upon the United States, many of whom were criminals released from prison. Id.
See also Jorge Dominguez, U.S. Policy Toward Cuba in the 1980's and 1990's, in
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: TRENDS IN U.S.CARIBBEAN RELATIONS 165, 167 (1994) (stating that many of the refugees were
criminals convicted of serious crimes).
6.
See Bob Benenson, Dissonant Voices Urge Clinton to Revise Policy On
Cuba, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Aug. 20, 1994, at 2498 (20,000 fled to Florida from
August 1 through August 26). The U.S. Coast Guard picked up 3,253 Cuban
refugees on August 23 alone. Id. Another 3,096 were picked up on August 24.
Steven Greenhouse, Flight From Cuba; Clinton Will Open Talks With Cuba on
Refugee Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, 28 Aug. 1994, at Al.
7.
For a 'news report dealing with Castro's demand for talks on the
embargo, see Greenhouse, supranote 6.
8.
Id.
9.
Robert G. Torricelli, Keep the Embargo, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1994, at
C7 (editorial by the Representative (D-N.J.) who was one of the main sponsors of
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992).
See Tom Kenworthy, U.S. Rejects Expansion of Talks With Castro;
10.
Administration to Stick to Migration Discussions, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1994, at
A14 (statement by Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnof). This policy of
attempting to isolate Cuba to bring about change is, generally, a continuation of
the policy of the Bush Administration. For the Bush Administration's policy see
Robert S. Gelbard, U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 3 U.S. DEPT ST. DISPATCH 314-15
(1992) (statement by Robert S. Gelband, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
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Administration established itself as a firm supporter of the
embargo and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA or the Act),
which tightened the embargo in an effort to encourage human
11
rights reform and democratization.
Domestic and foreign sources have increasingly criticized
certain aspects of the ongoing embargo and the CDA. For
instance, on September 9, 1994, the Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee called for a gradual lifting of the
embargo. 12 And, on October 26, 1994, the United Nations
General Assembly voted for the third year in a row to adopt a
resolution entitled "Necessity of ending the economic, commercial
and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America
13
against Cuba."
After describing the history behind the embargo, this Note
first considers the status of an international legal norm
prohibiting the unilateral use of economic coercion. Particular
attention is paid to whether there has been, in light of recent
Assembly votes, any post-Cold War development in the status of
such a norm. Next, the Note briefly examines recent economic
developments in Cuba that affect the utility of continuing the
embargo. This Note concludes that open economic forces in the
post-Cold War era are proving much more useful to Cuba in its
Inter-American Affairs, April 18, 1992, before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs).
11.
See Update-1994, supranote 1.
12.
Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) and Representative Lee Hamilton (DInd.), The Embargo Must Go, WASH. POSt, Sept. 8, 1994, at A19. Change in Cuba
will come from "an invasion of people, ideas, and information," wrote the two
chairmen, "not [from] a tightened embargo or a blockade." Id. Such an approach
recalls the toppling of the Berlin wall in 1989, as East Europeans became
increasingly aware of attractive developments in the West. U.S. Interest in PostCold War Latin America and the Caribbean: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 77-78 (1991) (statement of Arturo Valenzuela, Director of the Center for
Latin American Studies, Georgetown University).
Congress has been well advised of the advantages to be gained from a policy
of opening up to Cuba. In a February 1991 subcommittee hearing involving three
foreign affairs scholars, one foreign scholar warned Chairman Torricelli that the
U.S. embargo provides "one of the strongest supports of the Castro regime that
the regime has." Id. at 76 (statement of Joseph S. Tulchin, Director of the Latin
American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars). A second
scholar agreed, explaining that isolation feeds the "fundamental source" of
Castro's support: nationalism. Id. at 78 (statement of Arturo Valenzuela). The
third scholar disagreed, feeling that the Soviet Union would try to retain some
influence in Cuba. Id. at 76 (statement of Georges A. Fauriol, Director of the
Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
13.
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/9, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 24, U.N.

Doc. A/RES/49/9 (1994).

year, see infra Part V.

For a detailed discussion of the resolution for each
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fight to end the embargo than the futile pursuit
international legal norm prohibiting economic coercion.

of an

II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND SURROUNDING THE EMBARGO
U.S. President Kennedy proclaimed a formal embargo against
all trade with Cuba on February 3, 1962.14 Within a year and a
half, the U.S. government passed implementing regulations,
which have generally remained in place through the present
day.1 s As explained by the Treasury Department, the embargo
prohibits all financial and trade transactions with Cuba by
persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction.' 6 Examination of some of

14.
Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 157 (1959-1963), reprinted in 22
U.S.C. at 551 (1988).
15.
The embargo is administered through the Department of the Treasury
and the Department of Commerce. See generally MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE § 6 (1990 & 1994 Supp.) (discussing relevant current
regulations in detail).
The Treasury Department's Cuban Assets Control
Regulations (CACR's), 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1994), went into effect on July 8, 1963.
See id. at § 515.201(d) (noting effective date).
The relevant Commerce
Department regulations are found at 15 C.F.R. pts. 768-799 (1994).
The CACR's can be seen as based on either of two alternative statutory
authorities. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 225 n.1 (1984) (discussing the
alternative bases for the Treasury's issuance of new restrictions on travel to
Cuba). President Kennedy's Proclamation cited Title 22 as its authority, but the
court in Regan v. Wald treats the CACR's as based on the Trading With the
Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. app § 1 et seq. (1988). 468 U.S. at 225, n.1.
When President Kennedy proclaimed the embargo in 1962, section 5(b)(1) of
TWEA allowed the President to regulate foreign trade "during the time of war or
during any other period of national emergency declared by the President." See 50
U.S.C. app. § 5 (note on 1977 Amendment to § 5(b)(1)). And in 1962, a national
emergency was in effect concerning security threats posed by the Korean War and
the aggression of "communist imperialism." Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99
(1949-1953), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. app. at 1187 (1988).
In 1977, Congress changed the TWEA so that the President now can only
exercise the section 5(b)(1) power in a time of war-not in other times of national
emergency declared by the President. 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1988). Congress,
however, permitted the grandfathering of measures that were currently in place,
such as the Cuban embargo.
Id.
The only limitation that affects the
grandfathered measures is that the President must make yearly determinations
that the policy continues to be in the national interest. Id.
16.
See U.S. Policy and the Future of Cuba: The Cuban Democracy Act and
U.S. Travel to Cuba: Joint Hearing Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment; Western Hemisphere
Affairs; and InternationalOperations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1993) [hereinafter
Joint Hearing] (statement of the Honorable R. Richard Newcomb, Office of Foreign
Assets Control, Department of the Treasury). Mr. Newcomb explained that people
on U.S. soil, as well as overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies, were deemed
subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
Id. There have, however, traditionally been
exceptions to the embargo policy for limited cash remittances to family members

in Cuba, for certain travel transactions, and for specially licensed overseas
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the historical events surrounding the imposition and maintenance
of the embargo reveals that the function of the embargo has
evolved over time.
The United States has been heavily involved in Cuban affairs
since at least the turn of the 20th century. After emerging
victorious from the Spanish-American War, the United States
imposed the infamous Platt Amendment on the Cuban
Constitution. 17 Although the Platt Amendment was eliminated by
1934, extensive U.S. interests remained. In 1959, just before the
revolution, U.S. businesses transacted $500 million (about $2.5
billion in 1994 dollars) per year in commerce with Cuba,' 8 and
U.S. nationals had invested billions of dollars on the island. 19
From Cuba's perspective, the most vital economic link to the
United States was the yearly sugar quota that the United States
purchased under the Sugar Act of 1948.20
In 1959, Cuba
21
depended on sugar for seventy-seven percent of its export value.

subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Id. But, the Cuban Democracy Act changed this
situation. See infra Part III.
17.
The United States conditioned its removal of troops from Cuba on
Cuba's inclusion of the Platt Amendment in its new constitution. PHILLIP
BRENNER, FROM CONFRONTATION TO NECYTIATION: U.S. RELATIONS WITH CUBA 98

(1988). *The amendment assured United States dominance over Cuba by
stipulating that the United States had the right to intervene in Cuba, that the
United States had to approve any treaty in which Cuba gave another state special
rights, and that the United States could establish a naval base on the island.
JULES R. BENJAMIN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

62-65 (1990). After some cajoling of members of the sitting Cuban Constitutional
Convention, id. at 64-65, the Cubans agreed to the Platt Amendment in 1901.
BRENNER, supra, at 7. The United States intervened militarily three times before
the Platt Amendment was formally abrogated in 1934. Id. at 9, 97. The naval
base at Guantanamo Bay still exits today. Id. at 7.
18.
Cuba Scouting ForInvestors, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 1994, at 6B.
19.
U.S. citizens' property, which was nationalized by Castro, is valued by
the U.S. government today at $5.6 billion. Christopher Marquis, Sweeping Bill
Targets Investment in Cuba; Would Punish Nations, Lenders, Companies, THE
RECORD, Feb. 10, 1995, at A17, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
(discussing proposed legislation). The value of the property in 1962 was $1.8
billion. See 4 DEPT ST. DISPATCH 102, 103 (1993). The companies that lost the
most upon nationalization included International Telephone and Telegraph ($131
million), Moa Bay Mining ($88.3 million), American Sugar ($81 million), Standard
Oil ($71.6 million), and Texaco ($51 million). See Cuba Scouting For Investors,
supra note 18.
20.
Sugar Act of 1948, 7 U.S.C. § 1100 et seq. (1994) (original version at
61 Stat. 922 (1947)) (expired on Dec. 31, 1974).
21.
SUSAN SCHROEDER, CUBA: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL STATISTICS 414
(1982) (charting sugar as a share of yearly total export value). Sugar had
comprised 89% of Cuba's total export value in 1950 and 80% in 1955. Id. Even
after the revolution, sugar remained central to the Cuban economy, comprising
77% of the export value in 1970 and 89% in 1975. Id. In the early 1990's, sugar
still accounted for 75% of export earnings. Fact Sheet: Cuba, 4 U.S. DEPFT ST.
DISPATCH 102, 105 (1993). Only during Cuba's recent economic tailspin did
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Of those sugar exports, seventy percent were bought by the
United States at a premium contract price equal to eighty percent
22
over the world market price.
The rupture between the two nations was caused by a series
of events that began with the 1958 U.S. decision to stop
supporting the increasingly repressive Batista regime. 2 3 At the
time, the U.S. media 24 and some members of the Eisenhower
Administration considered Castro to be a welcome alternative to

Batista.2 5 However,

after Castro's successful

revolution

in

January 1959, the situation began to change. In late 1959 and
early 1960, following a series of Cuban acts hostile to U.S.-owned

sugar companies on the island, the United States began to talk of
reducing the vital sugar quota.2 6 At the same time, Cuba began
to develop trade links with the Soviet Union, especially in the oil

industry. 2 7

Pressure came to a head in June of 1960 when Cuba seized
U.S.- and British-owned oil refineries that had refused to process

tourism overtake sugar production as Cuba's main source of income. Cuba's
Economy Hits Bottom, May Be Recovering-U.N., REUTERS, Dec. 20, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. For more details on that sugar tailspin, see
infra Part VI.
22.
Brian H. Pollitt and G.B. Hagelberg, The Cuban Sugar Economy in the
Soviet Era and After, 18 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 547, 564 (1994) The United States
paid a premium due to the nature of international sugar-marketing
arrangements. See DONALD L. LOSMAN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THE
CASES OF CUBA, ISRAEL, AND RHODESIA 26 (1979). Most sugar from sugarproducing nations is sold under a contractual arrangement with the world's large
sugar consumers. The residual sugar market is small, as all the large consumers
already have contracts. Once the U.S. cancelled the Cuban sugar quota, the price
of sugar on the residual market could, in theory, have been severely depressed by
the unexpected glut of Cuban sugar, leaving Cuba in a desperate position. Id.
23.
RAY S. CLINE & ROGER W. FONTAINE, FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES IN CHINA,
CUBA, AND NICARAGUA: A PARADIGM 130-34 (1992) (discussing United States
stoppage of arms deliveries to Cuba).
24.
Id. at 120-130 (chronicling press reports that favored Castro and
disfavored Batista).
25.
Id. at 109-20 (detailing policy disagreements within the
Administration).
26.
On May 17, 1959, Prime Minister Castro signed the Agrarian Reform
Act, which limited the acreage that could be legally owned by private companies.
The remainder was to be expropriated with compensation to the owners. JANE
FRANKLIN, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND THE UNITED STATES: A CHRONOLOGICAL
HISTORY 26 (1992) (providing an excellent daily chronology of events, although
with a noticeable pro-Cuban slant). The United States subsequently rejected the
proposed terms of compensation.
Id. at 27. Meanwhile, Senator George
Smathers (D-Fla.) proposed a cut in the sugar quota. Id. Agitation increased for

cutting the sugar quota after Cuba expropriated property of U.S. sugar companies
in January, 1960. Id. at 29.
27.
Cuba signed trade and aid agreements, including an oil agreement,
with the Soviet Union when the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan visited
Cuba in February, 1960. Id. at 29-30.
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newly imported Soviet crude oil.28 In response, Secretary of State
Christian Herter appeared before Congress on June 22 to
recommend legislation that would authorize the President to
reduce the sugar quota.2 9 In early July, just before Cuba
authorized the nationalization of all U.S. commercial property in
Cuba, 30 Congress approved, and Eisenhower implemented,
3
legislation eliminating the remainder of the 1960 sugar quota. '
Eisenhower stated, "This action amounts to economic sanctions
against Cuba."32 Cuba retaliated on August 6 by nationalizing $1
billion worth of U.S. private investment on the island.3 3 On
October 14, all large commercial enterprises were nationalized,
including twenty more U.S. companies.34
Eisenhower's
cancellation of the entire sugar quota for 196135 became
inevitable. The embargo had, for all practical purposes, begun.
As the U.S.-Cuban relationship deteriorated, however, Cuba
was able to successfully avoid economic disaster. The potential for
such a disaster seemed real, since the United States alone
accounted for about seventy percent of both Cuban imports and

28.
Id. at 31. See also U.S. Protests Seizure of American Oil Refineries, 43
DEPT ST. BULL. 141 (1960) (note from the U.S. ambassador to Cuba delivered to
the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations on July 5, protesting the seizure of U.S.owned oil refineries). The ambassador's note emphasized that the oil did not
come from the companies' own sources of supply, that the companies had thus
far produced oil for the Castro regime despite a backlog of $50 million owed to
them, and that the seizures were contrary to Cuban law. Id. at 141-42.
29.
See PresidentialAuthority Sought to Reduce Sugar Quotas, 43 DEPI ST.
BULL. 58 (1960) (Secretary Herter's statement to the House Committee on
Agriculture). According to Secretary Herter, the primary reason for the legislation
was to "safeguard" U.S. consumers against fluctuations in the supply and price of
sugar. For support, he cited the relevant developments in Cuba, namely the land
redistribution and the increasing trade links with the Soviet Union, the Eastern
Bloc, and China. Id. at 58-59. Since Cuba was the greatest single supplier of
sugar to the United States, the Secretary urged the United States to diversify its
sources and reduce dependence. Id. at 59. Strong ideological concerns clearly
influenced his statement.
30.
FRANKLIN, supranote 26, at 31.
31.
Proclamation No. 3355, 3 C.F.R. 80 (1959-1963), reprinted in President
Reduces Cuban Sugar Quota for Balance of 1960, 43 DEPT ST. BULL. 140 (1960)
(White House press release dated July 6, asserting that because the behavior of
Cuba makes it an unreliable future supplier, the quota reduction serves the
national interest).
32.
FRANKLIN, supra note 26, at 31.
33.
BRENNER, supra note 17, at 98 (contains a useful chronology of events);
see also FRANKLIN, supranote 26, at 32.
34.
FRANKLIN, supranote 26, at 35; see also BRENNER, supranote 17, at 98.
35.
Proclamation No. 3383, 3 C.F.R. 100 (1959-63), reprintedin President
Sets Cuban Sugar Quota at Zero for First Quarter of 1961, 44 DEPT ST. BULL. 18
(1961) (statement by the President on December 16, noting Cuba's continued
hostility to the United States and Cuba's increasing sales of sugar to communist
states).
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exports prior to 1961;36 and, nonsocialist nations, as a group,
accounted for over ninety-seven percent.3 7 At the same time, as
U.S. trade with Cuba was reduced to virtually nothing,38 ideology
brought Cuba and the Soviet Bloc together.3 9 By 1962, Cuba had
successfully shifted over 80 percent of its imports and exports to
socialist trading partners. 40 In response to Eisenhower's July
1960 quota cuts, the U.S.S.R. immediately agreed to buy the
700,000 tons remaining in the year's quota.4 1 The socialist bloc
responded similarly to Eisenhower's elimination of the 1961
42
quota.
From 1961 through 1964, the U.S.-Cuban relationship
deteriorated further along ideological lines. After the United
States broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 3,
44
1961,43 "anti-Castro Cubans supported by the United States"
launched the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17. By
December 1961, Castro proclaimed: "I am a Marxist Leninist and
I shall be one till the end of my life." 4 5 Accordingly, in January

36.
Cuba Scouting ForInvestors, supranote 18.
37.
This statistic pertains to trade in 1959 and is reported by LOSMAN,
supranote 22, at 25 (charting Cuban Foreign Trade, 1959-67).
38.
Id. at 21.

39.

Id. at 24-26 (explaining why Cuba did not increase its trade with its

second-largest trading partner, Western Europe). With regard to exports, Western
Europe already had sugar contracts. Id. at 26 (discussing the nature of the sugar
market). With regard to imports, Cuba no longer had hard currency to pay out,
since currency had been earned primarily from sugar trade with the United
States. Id. The United States made sure that Cuba did not receive credit from
international lending agencies or from other Western nations' lending institutions.
BRENNER, supra note 33, at 13. The socialist bloc was simply willing, because of
political and ideological reasons, to finance trade with Cuba through grants and
credits. LOSMAN, supra note 22, at 26. Cuba's negative trade balance with the
socialist bloc ballooned, and formed a debt that Cuba may never pay back. Id.;
see also Brian Killen, Russia Considers New Imports of Cuban Raw Sugar, REUTER
EUR. BUS. REP., Jan. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS News Library, Curnws File
(stating that the 1995 Cuban debt to Russia of 17 to 20 billion "convertible
roubles" is a stumbling block in current trade relations, though the value of one
"convertible rouble" is not clear, ranging anywhere from one dollar to one-fiftieth
of one dollar).
40.
LOSMAN, supra note 22, at 25 (charting Cuban Foreign Trade, 195967). The percentages fluctuated from 1962 to 1967, but by 1967, socialist
imports and exports remained approximately 80%. Id.
41.
FRANKLIN, supranote 26, at 31.
42.
Id. at 37. As a direct response to the U.S. cut, socialist nations agreed
to buy four million tons of Cuban sugar. Id.
43.
BRENNER, supra note 17, at 98. For a discussion of U.S. policy making
concerning the embargo in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, see
generally BENJAMIN, supra note 17, at 188-211.
44.
These are the terms used by the U.S. Department of State to describe
the Bay of Pigs effort. See Fact Sheet: Cuba, supranote 21, at 103.
45.
BRENNER, supra note 17, at 99. Earlier, in April 1961, Castro had
announced that the revolution was socialist. Id. at 98.
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1962 the State Department officially characterized Cuba as "a
bridgehead of Sino-Soviet imperialism within the inner defenses of
the Western Hemisphere.""
The official implementation of the
embargo on February 6, 1962 amounted to Cold War action aimed
at "isolating" Cuba and "reducing the threat posed by its
alignment with the communist powers."4 7
After the Cuban
missile crisis of October 1962 and after the discovery that Cuba
was exporting arms to Central America in 1964, the Organization
of American States (OAS) 48 agreed to adopt a regional embargo
49
against Cuba.
No net change occurred in the U.S.-Cuban relationship
during the 1970s. In the early to mid-70s, a period of detente
occurred as Cuba, according to the U.S. State Department, deemphasized the export of its revolution.5 0
This thawing of
relations, however, was short-lived. By the late 1970s, Cuba
51
became militarily involved in conflicts in Ethiopia and Angola.

46.
DepartmentReports on Cuban Threats to the Western Hemisphere, 46
DEP T ST. BULL. 129, 130 (1962) (summary section of the State Department
document entitled "The Castro Regime in Cuba", discussing Cuba's dictatorial
regime, its military buildup, and its increasingly exclusive trade relations with
communist states).
47.
See Proclamation No. 3447, supranote 14 and accompanying text.

48.

The Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional organization

that has limited authority under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter to deal with
regional disputes. MARGARET DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 20 (1987). The OAS Charter was adopted at the Ninth International
Conference of American States in 1948. 1 F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, ED., THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM: TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, part 1, 67-69
(1983).
49.
See DOXEY, supranote 48, at 60-61 (1987) (describing U.S. success in
gaining the support of the Organization of American States after a cache of Cuban
arms was found in Venezuela); cf. FRANKLIN, supranote 26, at 71 (speaking merely
of U.S. "charges" of exported Cuban arms to Venezuelan guerrillas).
50.
Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 21, at 103-04. A number of factors
demonstrated the thaw in relations. The Organization of American States voted in
1975 to remove the regional embargo and to make continued measures voluntary.
Id. In 1976, the Ford Administration agreed to relax certain restrictions on trade
between Cuba and foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. See Jason S. Bell,
Comment, Violation of InternationalLaw and Doomed U.S. Policy: An Analysis of the
Cuban Democracy Act, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 77 (1993) (providing useful
history about the restraints on foreign subsidiaries' trade with Cuba, leading up
to the restraints in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992). Further, although
diplomatic relations remained officially broken, Cuba and the United States
agreed on September 1, 1977, to establish "interest sections" for each other in
their respective capitals. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supranote 21, at 104.
51.
Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 21, at 104; see generally BRENNER, supra
note 17, at 20-24 (detailing the impact that Cuban military involvement in Africa
had on U.S. policy makers). Although Canada refused to break trade relations
with Cuba during the 1960s, Canada suspended aid to Cuba in 1977 due to
Cuban military involvement in Angola. Canada Calls for End to Ban on Cuba,
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 30, 1994, at A10 available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
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Closer to home, dictators in both Grenada and Nicaragua were
overthrown and replaced by leaders who embraced the Cuban
regime.5 2 These events reinforced the Carter Administration's
views about the existence of a Soviet expansion plan. r 3 During
the 1980s, the Reagan Administration, characterized by its anticommunist zeal, moved to tighten the embargo.5
In sum, U.S. policy makers, from the 1960s through the
Reagan
Administration,
addressed
Cuba
not
as
an
underdeveloped Caribbean neighbor but as a threatening
adversary in the critical East-West conflict. 5 5 With the fall of both
the Berlin Wall and the U.S.S.R. that Cold War conflict came to
an abrupt end. With massive Soviet aid gone, 56 Cuba could no
longer pose an expansionist threat.5 7 Yet, despite such radical,
post-Cold War change, the embargo has remained in place, and
was even strengthened by the Cuban Democracy Act of October,
1992.

III. THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT OF 1992
President Bush signed the Cuban Democracy Act 5" on
October 23, 1992. The Act explicitly acknowledges the radical

File (providing some history of Canadian relations with Cuba, in light of Canada's
resumption of aid in June 1994).

52.

See BRENNER, supra note 17, at 23 (discussing the renewed U.S.

perception of Cuba as a major enemy).
53.
See id. at 22-23. The 1980 Mariel boat lift also exacerbated already
strained relations. Id. at 23; see also supranote 5 (discussing the Mariel boat lift).
54.
See generally BRENNER, supra note 17, at 31-41 (describing the policy
of the Reagan Administration).
55.
See generally id. at 32-33 (citing U.S. Departments of State and
Defense, The Soviet-Cuban Connection on Central America and the Caribbean,
Washington D.C., March 1985, at 1-2.)
56.
See supranote 1.
57.
With Soviet aid gone, Cuba ended military assistance to Nicaragua
after the Sandinista's electoral defeat in 1990. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 21, at
103. And, Cuban troops pulled out of Angola by July 1991. Id. Further, after
peace came to El Salvador in January 1992, Castro stated that his support for
insurgents was a thing of the past. Id. By January 1995, the Cuban air force and
navy were in disrepair, and the military had turned to supervising tourism, food
distribution, and farmers markets. Santiago Aroca, Military Taking Over Cuban
Economy, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 23, 1995, at A8, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File. For discussion of the wrecked Cuban economy, see infra Part VI.
58.
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (Supp. V 1993)). The Cuban Democracy Act
has been discussed extensively by other commentators. See Kam S. Wong,
Comment, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: the Extraterritorial Scope of §
1706(a), 14 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 651 (1994) (dealing also with the economic
ramifications of the embargo for U.S. business); Julia P. Herd, Note, The Cuban
DemocracyAct: Another ExtraterritorialAct That Won't Work 20 BROOK. J. INrL L.
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changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that threatened
Cuba's food and oil supplies.5 9 Describing the situation as an
"unprecedented opportunity" for the United States and the
international- democratic community "to promote a peaceful

transition to democracy in Cuba,"60 the Act calls attention to
Cuba's intransigence in its disregard for human rights and

democratic values. 61
The Act's explicit statement of policy
declares that the United States will reduce the embargo in
"carefully calibrated ways" if Castro responds with positive
developments. 6 2 In the meantime, to take advantage of this
"unprecedented opportunity," the Act tightened the embargo in
highly controversial ways.
Two provisions of the Act have especially angered the world
community. First, § 1706(a) of the CDA removes a previous
loophole that had allowed offshore foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
63
companies to obtain licenses from the Treasury Department.
That loophole had allowed hundreds of millions of dollars of trade
to flow to Cuba in recent years.64 Even U.S. allies in the

397 (1994) (providing an analysis of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
RESATMEENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS IAW OF THE UNITED STATES); Trevor
R. Jefferies, Note, The Cuban DemocracyAct of 1992: A Rotten Carrotand a Broken
Stick?, 16 HOUS. J. INr'LL. 75 (1993) (providing a section by section analysis of the

Act); Bell, supra note 50 (providing useful historical background on the
extraterritorial provision relating to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies); Allen
DeLoach Stewart, Comment, New World Ordered: The Asserted Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 53 LA. L. REV. 1389 (1993)
(providing a unique argument for the unconstitutionality of part of the Act under
U.S. law, as well as discussion about the international law aspects).
59.
Cuban Democracy Act § 1702(5), (6), 22 U.S.C. § 6001(5), (6) (Supp. V
1993).
60.
Id. at § 1702(1), (4), (7), 22 U.S.C. § 6001(1), (4), (7) (Supp. V 1993).
61.
Id. at § 1702(6), 22 U.S.C. § 6001(6) (Supp. V 1993).
62.
Id. at § 1703(7), 22 U.S.C. § 6002(7) (Supp. V 1993). The requisite
positive developments include free and fair elections, id. at § 1703(8), 22 U.S.C. §

6002(8) (Supp. V 1993), but, more generally, the movement toward democracy
and respect for human rights. Id. at § 1703(6), 22 U.S.C. § 6002(6) (Supp. V
1993).
63.
Id. at § 1706(a), 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a) (Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting the
issuance of future licenses under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31
C.F.R. § 515.559 (1994)). The explicit changes to the embargo effected by the
CDA are explained in Joint Hearing, supra note 16, at 20. For the history of the
loophole, see Bell, supranote 50, at 88.
64.
The amount of trade permitted with Cuba under this loophole equalled
(in millions) $332 in 1989, $705 in 1990, $718 in 1991, $336 in 1992, and $1.6
in 1993. Joint Hearing, supra note 16, at 21. The 1993 numbers show the
immediate, dramatic impact of the CDA. Id. This impact resulted from the
Treasury Department's determination to enforce the CDA provisions, despite the
issuance of blocking orders by Canada and Great Britain. Id. The blocking orders
made it illegal, under domestic law, for subsidiaries on British and Canadian soil
to comply with the CDA. Id.
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European Community stated that § 1706(a) illegally asserts
extraterritorial jurisdiction, forcing firms on foreign soil to forgo
business to comply with U.S. foreign policy. 6 5
Many U.S.
commentators also agree that the extraterritoriality of § 1706(a) is

contrary to international law. 66 Nevertheless, the flow of trade
from the offshore foreign subsidiaries has all but stopped. 6 7
Second, § 1706(b)(1) of the CDA prohibits any ship from

entering a U.S. port if that ship has visited a Cuban port in the
previous six months. 6 8 According to European Community (EC)
statements, this provision violates international law.6 9 Yet, the
Treasury Department believes that this measure has been
70
successful in diverting trade from Cuba.
The controversy surrounding these measures was not
unexpected. In fact, the Bush Administration had originally
opposed the Cuban Democracy Act.7 1
Respecting foreign
sovereignty, the Administration had argued against commanding
foreign nations to cooperate with U.S. policy aims. 7 2 Any such

command, said the Administration, would diminish world support
for U.S. policy and would provide Cuba with a new opportunity to
portray itself as a victim. 7 3 Yet, as the 1992 presidential election

approached, Bush-opponent Bill Clinton proclaimed his support
for the CDA to influential anti-Castro Cuban-American voters in

65.
See Note of April 7, 1992,from the Delegation of the Commission of the
European Communities and the Embassy of Portugalto the U.S. State Department,
in Letter Dated 11 June 1992 from the Charge d'affaires a.i of the Permanent
Mission of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
GAOR 47th Sess., Appendix, Agenda Item 39 of the Preliminary List, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/47/273 (1992) [hereinafter Note of April 7, 1992]; see also Ddmarche of
April 18, 1990from the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities
and the Embassy of Ireland to the U.S State Department, in Letter Dated 11 June
1992from the Charge d'affaires a.L of the PermanentMission of Cuba to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-Genera4 U.N. GAOR 47th Sess., Appendix to
Annex 1, Agenda Item 39 of the Preliminary List, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/47/272 (1992)
[hereinafter Ddmarcheof April 18, 1990].
66.
For views of U.S. commentators who have analyzed the extraterritorial
provisions of the CDA under the RESATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, see, e.g., Herd, supra note 56 at 418-24 ; Bell, supra
note 50 at 106-18; Stewart, supra note 58, at 1392-99.
67.
See supra note 64 (providing statistics on the flow of such trade both
before and after implementation of the CDA).
68.
Cuban Democracy Act § 1706(b)(1), 22 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(1) (Supp. V
1993).
69.
Note of April 7, 1992, supra note 65; see also Ddmarche of April 18,
1990, supranote 65.
70.
Joint Hearing,supranote 16, at 37-38.
71.
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 3 U.S. DEPT ST. DISPATCH 312, 316-17 (1992)
(statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 8, 1992).
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 316.
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Florida. Not to be outdone, President Bush agreed to support the
Act, signing it on October 23, 1992.7 4 The pressures of the tight
1992 campaign and the block of influential voters in Florida
75
appear to have dictated U.S. policy toward Cuba.
As the Clinton Administration points out, the CDA does
include some measures aimed at reaching out to the Cuban
people;7 6 but, the main thrust of the Act is to continue the longstanding embargo, even to tighten it, in hopes of pressuring
Castro toward reform. The following sections will examine the
legality of such economic coercion, especially in light of recent
U.N. activity.

IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF ECONOMIC COERCION AND OF THE EMBARGO
PRIOR TO RECENT UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITY

While the U.N. Charter clearly prohibits the use or threat of

armed force in international relations, 7" the existence of a norm

74.
For a well-developed account of the relationship between the CDA and
the presidential campaign of 1992, see Bell, supra note 50, at 96-98; see also
DOMINGUEZ, supranote 5, at 172-73.
75.
For a criticism of the U.S. policy as pure symbolism for electoral
purposes, see DOMINGUEZ, supra note 5, at 175. Dominguez echoes the widelyheld opinion, see, e.g., supranote 12 and accompanying text, that tightening the
embargo, as opposed to opening up to Cuba, fuels Castro's nationalist appeal at
home. Id.
76.
The Cuban Democracy Act One Year Later, 4 DEPTI ST. DISPATCH 853,
855 (1993) (statement of Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter
American Affairs, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, November 18,
1993). The administration claims that the policy of the Cuban Democracy Act
says "no' to a dictatorial government" while giving "an emphatic 'yes' to the
people who suffer under it." Id. The act allows donations of food to individuals
and nongovernmental organizations in Cuba, and it permits the licensing of
shipments of medicine and medical supplies to Cuba. Cuban Democracy Act §
1705(b), (c), 22 U.S.C. § 6004(b), (c) (Supp. V 1993). The State Department
claims that, in the first year of the Cuban Democracy Act, the Treasury
Department issued over $3 million worth of such licenses. The Cuban Democracy
Act: One Year Later,supra,at 854.
The Act also includes measures aimed at establishing effective
telecommunications and direct mail links with Cuba. Cuban Democracy Act §
1705(e), (f), 22 U.S.C. § 6004(e), (f) (Supp. V 1993). Indeed, U.S. long distance
companies began direct dial service to and from Cuba on November 25, 1994.
PlanningHelps Ease Travel Efforts, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 1994, at 6B.
77.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 contains such a prohibition. See Derek W.
Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisalsby States, 13 VA. J. INTL L. 1, 1-2 (1972)
(stating that there is general agreement that Article 2(4) prohibits the use or
threat of armed force in reprisal).
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prohibiting economic force is an entirely different matter.78

The

critical first issue in analyzing the legality of the embargo is
whether an international legal norm exists that prohibits the
unilateral use of economic coercion. If no such norm exists, the
U.S. embargo is simply an act of "retorsion," an inherently legal
act taken against another state.7 9 If, on the other hand, such a
norm does exist, the U.S. embargo must then be analyzed as a
"reprisal" or, in more modem terms, a "countermeasure."8 0 A
countermeasure is an illegal act that, under certain conditions,8 1
82
is deemed legally permissible as self-help.
A 1981 work on the legality of the U.S. embargo against Cuba
concluded that the embargo was illegal by categorizing it as a
reprisal (or countermeasure) and then evaluating it under specific
legal requirements.8 3 This section of the Note examines relevant
sources of international law84 and addresses the all-important

78.
See generally Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in
ContemporaryInternationalLaw, 79 AM. J. INTL L. 405 (1985) (stating that states'
diplomatic interactions naturally involve coercion of various forms).
79.
See ELIZABETH ZOLLER, PEACEIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF
COUNTERMEASURES 5-6 (1984) (defining retorsion).
80.
See OMER ELAGAB, THE LEGALnIY OF NON-FORCIBLE COUNIERMEASURES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1988) [hereinafter ELAGAB-1988] (distinguishing between
reprisals and countermeasures).

81.

For extensive treatment of the conditions to which countermeasures

are subjected, see generally id. at 10-36. As wholly legal acts, retorative
measures are not subject to the legal restraints that limit countermeasures.
ZOLLER, supranote 79, at 43-44. As a result, retorative measures can, in fact, be
even more devastating to target nations than countermeasures. Id.
82.
For a discussion of the role of self-help in international law, see
ZOLLER, supranote 79, at 4.
83.
Paul A. Shneyer & Virginia Barta, The Legality of the U.S. Economic
Blockade of Cuba Under InternationalLaw, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 451, 457
(1981). Shneyer and Barta infer that the embargo against Cuba is a reprisal for
no other reason than their discovery of the general topic of "embargoes" listed
under the topic of "reprisals" in the 1968 Digest of InternationalLaw, published
by the U.S. State Department. Id. (citing 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 321-329 (1968)).
Additionally, Shneyer and Barta find the embargo illegal under what they call
a "contemporary" legal standard that gives increasing weight to General Assembly
resolutions. Id. at 468-77. For a different approach to General Assembly
resolutions, see infra Part IV.
84.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute], is generally considered to contain
a complete statement of the sources of international law.
IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (4th ed. 1990); see also SIR ROBERT
JENNINGS AND SIR ARTHUR WATTS, EDS., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (9th ed.
1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM'S-9th ed.].
Accordingly, any norm relating to
economic coercion must be rooted in an Article 38 source. The sources most
relevant for economic coercion are found in Article 38, paragraph 1: "a)
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
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expressly recognized by the contesting states; b) international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law." I.C.J. Statute, supra,art. 38.
Professor Jonathan I. Charney argues that "general international law," also
listed as a source of international law in paragraph (1)(c) of Article 38, should be
considered a relevant source of law when there are pertinent resolutions and
proposals from the United Nations General Assembly or from other multilateral
organizations. Jonathan I. Chamey, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 529, 546 (1993). Such activity by official organizations, posits Professor
Chamey, can result in more rapid formation of norms than would occur through
the regular process for the development of "international custom," without
requiring the strict formality of a specific international convention or treaty. Id. at
546-47. Most importantly, such general international law would be binding on all
states, despite objections by a few recalcitrant states. Id. at 529. Professor
Chamey argues that such new rules for the formation of international law are
necessary because the world seeks to deal with modem issues, such as global
environmental problems, in which the cooperation of all states is necessary. Id.
As for General Assembly resolutions relating to economic coercion, a number
of other commentators have discussed them as interpretations of the U.N.
Charter. See infra Part IV-B.3(b). This Note will proceed in a similar manner,
rather than present a separate analysis under Professor Charney's theory about
general international law.
For two reasons, such a separate analysis is not necessary. First, the separate
analysis would be largely redundant because, not surprisingly, the factors that
Professor Charney lists as relevant to the formation of general international law
are very similar to the factors that are relevant in identifying authoritative
interpretations of existing international law. Compare Chamey, supra at 544-45
(listing specific factors) with infra text accompanying note 113 (listing specific
factors). Thus, an inquiry into the existence of a norm concerning economic
coercion should come to the same determination regardless of whether Professor

Charney's analysis or a more traditional analysis is used. More broadly, Professor
Chamey's general international law appears, for most purposes, to be largely
equivalent to either rapidly formed international custom, involving the input of

official multilateral international organizations, or interpretation of existing
international law.
The second reason that this Note will not present a separate analysis under
Professor Charney's theory is that his theory elevates Article 38, paragraph (1)(c)
to a position that is out of step with Article 38's history and with how the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) has used Article 38. This point merits
discussion at some deep, jurisprudential levels that this Note will not attempt to
reach, other than to provide the following statements.
Due to the strong influence of positivism, Article 38 gives "decisive" weight to
the will of states as the source of international law. OPPENHEiM'S-9th ed., supra,
at 24-25. See generally L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 106-107 (H.
Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (describing the broad influence of positivism)
[hereinafter OPPENHEIM'S-8th]; GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN
INTRODUCION TO PUBLIC INIERNATIONAL LAW 33 (6th ed., 1992) (discussing the
predominance of the positivist school). But see OPPENHEIM'S-9th, supra, at 25 n.9
(citing OPPENHEIM'S-8th, supra, at 106-107, to state that rigid adherence to
positivism has been abandoned); Charney, supra, at 542-43 (showing how the
emergence of jus cogens norms after World War II undermines positivism).
Significantly, when paragraph (1)(c) was being written, specific revisions were
made to prevent the I.C.J. from basing rulings, as the natural law proponents
would have liked, simply upon subjective principles of justice. BROWNLIE, supra,
at 15-16. The authors of Article 38 recognized that such broad power to render
subjective rulings would be mistrusted by international governments. Id. at 16.
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question,
glossed over by the 1981 work:
whether an
international legal norm that prohibits the unilateral use of
economic coercion exists.
As a practical matter, much of a typical state's international
trade activity involves a form of coercion. 8 5 Consequently, any
norm concerning economic coercion must adequately define what
is prohibited. This section of the Note concludes that prior to the
recent U.N. votes on the embargo, a norm prohibiting the use of
unilateral economic coercion had not been established.
A. Customary Law
As manifest in a classic statement by Emmerich de Vattel,
customary international law has long permitted nations to
conduct their trade relations in any way they see fit:
It is clear that it is for each Nation to decide whether it will carry on
commerce with another or not. If it wishes to allow commerce with
a certain Nation, it has the right to impose such conditions as it
shall think fit; for in permitting another Nation to trade, it grants
the other a right, and every one is at liberty to 6 attach such
8
conditions as he places to his voluntary concessions.

Thus, historically, there has been no norm prohibiting the use of
economic coercion.

Accordingly, as even Professor Chamey acknowledges, Chamey, supra, at 536,
the I.C.J. has used the paragraph (1)(c) source sparingly. BROWNLIE, supra, at 17.
The most common use of that source has been for rules of evidence, rules of
procedure, or jurisdictional questions. Id. at 16, 18. In sum, paragraph (1)(c) has
been applied where rules cannot be expected to form from state practice, but
where, at the same time, rules are necessary to make international law into a
viable system. See id. at 16. Paragraph (1)(c) simply does not, and was never
intended to recognize "general principles of law' as the basis for major, new
substantive norms in international law.
Professor Charney would invoke general international law to help solve some
of the world's pressing, modem problems. But, those problems are, clearly,
political ones.
Changing the legal theories behind the development of
international law cannot get around that. Rather, in light of the Article 38
drafters' wariness about including too much natural law content, adding more
natural law content today is more likely to undermine the current level of
acceptance for the international legal system than to solve any major modern
problems.
85.
Derek W. Bowett, InternationalLaw and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J.
INrLL. 245, 248 (1976).
86.
EMMERICH DE VATIEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 41 (Charles G. Fenvick
trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1916)(1758)(this edition in english is part
of a set that also includes a french version of the work); see also Clinton E.
Cameron, Note, Developing A Standardfor PoliticallyRelated State Economic Action,
13 MICH. J. INrL L. 218, 222 (1991)(citing the same material from another
translation).
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There has been some debate 7 about whether portions of the
U.N. Charter and various General Assembly resolutions have
constituted sufficient state practice and opinio juris s to create a
customary legal norm prohibiting economic coercion. In the 1986
case of Military and ParamilitaryActivities (Nicaragua v. United
States), however, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)
addressed the propriety of the U.S. embargo of Nicaragua under
customary international law.8 9 The court found that the embargo
did not amount to a violation of the customary law of nonintervention.9" Rather, just like de Vattel, the I.C.J. stated that,
in the absence of a treaty, one state has no obligation to continue
trade relations with another any longer than it sees fit. 9 1 Thus,
the court made clear that customary law did not, through 1986,
prohibit economic coercion.

87.

See, e.g., Sir Ian Sinclair, The Significance of the Friendly Relations

Declaration, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MICHAEL AKEHURST 8-20 (Vaughan Lowe & Colin Warbrick
eds., 1994) (presenting a variety of views about whether resolutions can
legitimately constitute state practice or opiniojuris,or both).
88.
State practice and opiniojurisare the two elements necessary to create
customary law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 97-98 (June 27). See also Charney, supra note 84, at 537 ("uniform
state practice in international relations combined with an opinio juris produces
international law"). Exactly what state actions constitute state practice can be
debated. See Sinclair, supra note 87, at 8-20. Opinio juris is a "subjective
element," beyond a state's practice, comprised of a state's opinion that its practice
reflects a legal obligation. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra at 97-98;
Charney, supra note 84, at 543. For a general overview on the formation of
customary international law, see BROWNLIE, supranote 84, at 4-11.
89.
Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 88, at 14.
For a
concise overview of this lengthy case, see also GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG
NAtiONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 190-200 (6th ed., 1992).
On the issue of economic coercion, Nicaragua complained that the United States
had done three things that, although permissible when taken alone, cumulatively
amounted to a violation of the customary law of nonintervention: 1) the United
States cut its aid to Nicaragua; 2) the United States cut the sugar quota
purchased from Nicaragua; and 3) the United States instituted a trade embargo
against Nicaragua. Military and Paramilitary Activities, supranote 88, at 125-26.
90.
Military and Paramilitary Activities, supranote 88, at 126.
91.
Id. at 138. The I.C.J. did, however, hold that the United States had
violated other customary legal norms by supporting military and paramilitary
activities against Nicaragua. Id. at 109-10, 121-122. The court further held that
the United States had violated a specific economic treaty between the two nations.
Id. at 140, 148. Because of some jurisdictional aspects of the case, however, the
court did not deal with norms from the U.N. Charter or the OAS Charter. Id. at
138. The court also declined to discuss the GATT. Id. at 125-126.
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B. The U.N. Charterand Attempts to InterpretIt

1. The Charter's Language
There are several sections of Article 2 of the U.N. Charter that
nations and commentators have interpreted to include a norm
prohibiting the use of economic coercion. 9 2 While Article 2(4)'s
prohibition of the use or threat of force may seem to be the most
logical place to find such a norm, the Charter's 1945 travaux
93
preparatoires
clearly demonstrate that Article 2(4) was not
intended to apply to economic force. 9 4 If the U.N. Charter is to be
considered a regulator of economic coercion, it must fulfill that
role through Article 2(7) and its principle of non-intervention. 95

As the following subsections explain, U.N. General Assembly
resolutions have failed in their attempts to distill any specific
norm against economic coercion from the vague principle of nonintervention.
2. The General Assembly's Attempts to Interpret Article 2(7) to
Include a Norm Prohibiting Economic Coercion
Three General Assembly resolutions, adopted in 1965, 1970,
and 1974, form the backbone of the current argument that
economic coercion is prohibited under the principle of non-

intervention. 9 6 In the 1965 Declaration on Intervention, adopted

92.
In addition to Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, which are
discussed in the text above, one commentator has suggested that Article 2(3) be
used to regulate economic coercion. Cameron, supra note 86, at 250-252.

However, Article 2(3) has received little attention from nations and commentators,
and today seems little more than a corollary of Article 2(4). See ELAGAB-1988,
supra note 80, at 197-98.
93.
Travaux preparatoiresare "the materials constituting the development
and negotiation of an agreement." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §325 cmt. e (1987) [hereinafter RESIATEMENT (THIRD)].

The travauxpreparatoireslend insight into the "genuine will" of the signatories at
the time of the signing. See BRUNO SIMMA, ED., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 37-38 (1994). Thus, they serve as an aid in interpreting
the U.N. Charter. Id. Some argue that the value of the travaux preparatoires
diminishes as more and more nations that did not participate in the original
creation of the treaty become U.N. members. Id.
94.
Most commentators agree that Article 2(4) does not pertain to
economic force, since a proposal to include a prohibition of "economic force" in
the Charter was overwhelmingly rejected in 1945. See, e.g., ELAGAB-1988, supra
note 80, at 197-200; Bowett, supra note 85, at 245.
95.
ELAGAB-1988, supra note 80, at 199-200.

96.

See Cuba's argument to the General Assembly, infra Part V-B; see

generally ELAGAB-1988, supra note 80, at 202-12 (citing these resolutions while
debating the legality of economic coercion).
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without a dissenting vote and with only one abstention, the
General Assembly "solemnly declares," "No state may use or
encourage the use of economic, political, or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure
from it advantages of any kind." 97 Then, in 1970, the General
Assembly adopted the Declaration on Friendly Relations without a
vote, under apparently unanimous agreement. 9 8
That
Resolution's first operative section "solemnly proclaims" seven
principles, one of which is "the principle concerning the duty not
to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any
State, in accordance with the Charter."9 9 The resolution then

specifically elaborates upon the duty of non-intervention, using
virtually the same language as that quoted above from the 1965
Declaration on Intervention.1

0

0

In

1974, as part of a resolution

containing the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,

similar language was repeated a third time by the General
Assembly and adopted by a margin of 120 to six, with ten
abstentions.' 0 ' However, there is much debate about whether the
General Assembly actually has authority to "declare" law and
whether such "declarations" can ever have binding legal effects.

97.
Declarationon the Inadmissibilityof Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res.
2131, 20th Sess., 1408th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 107, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2131(XX)/Rev.1. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.N.Y.B. 87-95. The lone
abstention was by the United Kingdom. See 1965 U.N.Y.B. 94.
98.
Declaration on the Principles of InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly
Relations and CooperationAmong States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25th Sess., 1883rd plen.
mtg., Agenda Item 85, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.N.Y.B. 787.
99.
Id. at 790.
100. Id. The one minor difference is the replacement of the word "or" with
"and" in the phrase "subordination in the exercise of its sovereign rights or to
secure from it advantages of any kind." (emphasis added). An explanation of that
minor change is offered in Gillian White, A New InternationalEconomic Order?, 16
VA. J. INT L. 323,330 (1976).
101.
See G.A. Res. 3281, 29th Sess., 2315th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 48, at
art. 32, A/RES/3281(XXIX) (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.N.Y.B. 401-407. This
time, the language relating to economic coercion, found in Article 32 of the
resolution's Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, simply dealt with
"subordination of the exercise of [a nation's] sovereign rights," completely
dropping the part about securing advantages.
Id. The resolution was not
supported by the Western economic powers. Among those voting against it were
the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany; among those
abstaining were Canada, France, Italy, and Japan. See 1974 U.N.Y.B. 402-03. It

is significant to note, however, that most of the controversy in the vote concerned
Article 2, which dealt with compensation for nationalized property. See id. at 39497, 401 (providing the vote tally for the controversial section). When a separate
vote was taken on the language relevant to economic coercion, the result was 119
to zero, with 11 abstentions. Id. at 402.
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3. The Legal Results of the General Assembly's Attempts to
Interpret Article 2(7) to Include a Norm Prohibiting Economic
Coercion
a. Does the General Assembly Have Authority to Declare Law?
One argument is that General Assembly resolutions are mere
recommendations and nothing more.
Proponents of that
argument would state that, except for certain internal and
administrative matters,1° 2 the U.N. Charter has only granted the
General Assembly the power to recommend.1 0 3 Alternatively,
Professor Blaine Sloan points out that the General Assembly has,
since its inception, been passing resolutions that are declaratory

and interpretive of existing law.1 °4 He persuasively argues that
because of their form and intent, the General Assembly's
declaratory resolutions cannot be dismissed as mere
recommendations.10 5 Still, as Professor Sloan concedes, the firm
establishment of the propriety of "law-declaring" resolutions
within the General Assembly does not answer all the questions
about the legal effects of such resolutions outside the U.N. 1o6
b. What is the Legal Effect of a General Assembly Declaration?
Decidedly not a legislative body with its own power to create
binding international obligations,' 0 7 the General Assembly can
still issue resolutions that relate to international law in two
significant ways. First, a resolution can arguably represent,
either or both state practice and opinio jwris, the two elements
necessary for the formation of new customary international

102. For elaboration upon the clear binding force of the General Assembly's
decisions concerning internal matters, see Blaine Sloan, General Assembly
Resolutions Revisited, 40 Years Later, 58 BRIT. Y.B. INM"L L. 39, 52-61 (1988)
[hereinafter Sloan-1988]; see also Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of
InternationalLaw By the PoliticalOrgans of the United Nations, 59 PROC. AM. SOC.
INT'LL. 116 (1964).
103. See U.N. CHARTER Art. 14.
104. Sloan-1988, supranote 102, at 45-46.
105. Blaine Sloan, Interpretingthe U.N. Charter, 1 PACE Y.B. INTL L. 61, 122
(1989)[hereinafter Sloan-1989] (quoting Oscar Schacter, The Crisis of Legitimation
in the United Nations, 50 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL REr: ACMA

SCANDINAVICAJURIS GENTIUM 3, 3-4 (Alf Ross memorial lecture, 1981)).
106. Sloan-1988, supranote 102, at 44-45.
107. General Assembly resolutions are generally not binding, BROWNLIE,
supra note 84, at 14, and are, prima facie, unable to create legal obligations. Id.
at 699 n.94. But see Sloan-1989, supra note 105, at 121-22 (stating that General

Assembly resolutions may go more than half way toward establishing a new
source of law).
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law.1 0 8 Second, resolutions can contain statements of existing law
10 9
that are already binding without reference to the resolution.
While it can be quite tedious to determine whether a new
customary law has been formed through General Assembly
resolutions, 110 the I.C.J. has already given its opinion on the
status of a customary law prohibiting the use of economic
coercion. 111 Thus, this Note will concentrate on the value of the
three aforementioned resolutions as interpretations of the existing
law of the U.N. Charter. The argument that the U.N. Charter, as
interpreted, prohibits economic coercion, has not been directly
ruled upon by the I.C.J." 2
The legal effect of a resolution as an interpretation of existing
law is determined by much more than simply whether it passes
by a majority vote. It depends on a number of factors, which can
broadly be grouped into three categories: 1) the resolution's terms
and intent; 2) delegates' voting patterns and support; and 3) state
practice." 3 If, under the first factor, the General Assembly does
not use terms that express an intent to declare or interpret law,
resolutions will remain mere recommendations, as provided in the

108. For a thorough presentation of the spectrum of views on the role of
General Assembly resolutions in the formation of customary international law, see
generally Sinclair, supranote 87. Sinclair's useful compilation of views highlights
the debate about whether a nation's vote for a resolution constitutes state
practice and how much practice is needed to establish a rule of customary
international law. Sinclair subscribes to a middle position, in which a nation's
vote endorsing a particular norm at least constitutes evidence of opinio juris with
respect to that norm. Id. at 27. Nevertheless, Sinclair recognizes that there is

little agreement about the role of General Assembly resolutions in the formation
of customary international law. Id. (quoting Shakespeare's Caliban stating "the
isle is full of noises").
109. See Oscar Schacter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INTL L. 1 (1994).
Schacter emphasizes that resolutions can gain binding force as authentic
interpretations of the U.N. Charter or as affirmations of recognized customary
international law. Id. at 3.
110. See id.
111. See supra PartIV-A.
112. See supranote 91 (discussing the I.C.J.'s refusal to discuss the norms
from the U.N. Charter in the 1986 case of Military and Paramilitary Activities).
Note, however, that the I.C.J.'s indication in the Military and Paramilitary
Activities case that there is no customary law prohibiting the use of economic
coercion is still highly relevant to the above question concerning an interpretation
of the U.N. Charter. The reason is that if state practice and opinio juris, with
respect to economic coercion, are insufficient to create customary law, the state
practice may also serve to destroy or at least weaken a norm derived from the
U.N. Charter. The bottom line is that state practice, though absolutely essential
in establishing customary law, is also highly relevant to determining the state of
the law in a treaty or international agreement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 93, § 325(2) & cmt. c. (following Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention in a
section entitled "Interpretation of International Agreement").
113. Sloan-1988, supra note 102, at 138.
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U.N. Charter.1 1 4 But, building on the well-established principle
that parties to a treaty may make an authentic interpretation of
it,1 1 5 and on the principle that delegates to the U.N. have an
inherent power to represent their respective nations,1 1 6 a number
of commentators have generally agreed that resolutions that
manifest an intent to be law-declaring should be given weight as
probative evidence of the state of the law.1 1 7 The weight given
those interpretations will be based upon a balance of the three
18
factors.'

114. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 14.
115. Sloan-1989, supranote 105, at 59.
116. Id at 44-45.
117. Compare the following views: Schacter, supra note 109, at 1-3
(providing an extreme view that the General Assembly can create binding law
where delegates manifest the requisite intent, though admitting that the binding
quality is seriously undermined by the negative votes or subsequent
nonobservance of the law by states particularly affected, or both); Sloan-1988,
supra note 102, at 59-60 (providing an extreme view that a norm from a nearly
unanimously adopted resolution should be presumptively binding, unless clearly
rejected in subsequent state practice); BROWNLIE, supra note 84, at 699-700
(providing a moderate view that resolutions and declarations provide evidence of
the state of the law and of the meaning of texts, and thus have "considerable legal
significance"); Sinclair, supra note 87, at 9 (quoting 0. Schacter, 178 HAGUE
RECEUIL DES COURS 111, 116-17 (1982-V) (providing a moderate view that law-

declaring resolutions are evidentiary with respect to the state of the law and that

other pertinent data should be assessed)).
Clearly, commentators vary as to how much weight should be given to lawdeclaring resolutions as compared to state practice and opinio juris outside the
United Nations.
Interestingly, Professor Sloan's three factors, supra text
accompanying note 113, specifically refer to factors both inside and outside the
United Nations. The other scholars' parenthetical remarks, supra, do the same.
Seemingly, very little is excluded from the analysis.
The following appears to be a sensible conclusion: declarations are attempts
to create standards, but the attempts will be legally insignificant unless states
proceed to follow the standards with a regularity that at least approaches that
which is required for the formation of customary law. The remaining ambiguity in
this conclusion probably means, in a practical sense, that in international
litigation, one side can cite declarations and resolutions to provide an easy
articulation of a norm for a court, should the court wish to find that a customary
legal norm has been created.
Professor Charney has provided some reasons why a court should wish to
ease the requirements for the formation of new, binding international law. See
Charney, supra note 84, at 529. But his articulated reasons concern global
environmental problems and other modem issues, not a classic issue such as
economic coercion. Thus, at least with respect to economic coercion, maintaining
a close analogy to customary law appears appropriate. For a more general
critique of Professor Charney's propositions, see supranote 84.
118. See supra note 117 (compiling scholars views that demonstrate the
relevance of these factors).
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c. Analysis: the Legal Effect of the Resolutions Concerning
Economic Coercion
Of the three resolutions cited above, the 1970 Declaration is
the clearest expression of an intent to declare law. Its final
paragraph states that the U.N. Charter's principles, now
embodied in the Declaration, "constitute basic principles of
international law." 1 19 Since support for the Declaration was
unanimous, some commentators have gone so far as to declare it
an authentic or authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter by
the nations that are party to it. 120 Others have cast doubt on
such a far-reaching statement. 12 1 In either case, assuming
arguendo that states' approval of the 1970 Declaration involved
law-declaring terms and intent, the 1970 Declaration-even
bolstered by the related 1965 and 1974 resolutions-failed to
establish a binding norm dealing with economic coercion. That
failure is evident in the terms of the 1970 Declaration and in
subsequent state practice.
Terms

The language relating to economic coercion in the 1970
Declaration was intentionally left vague to achieve consensus on
As stated in 1975 by the British
the overall agreement.
representative to the Special Committee on Friendly Relations,
an
.
[The Declaration] represents on many points
accommodation between conflicting and strongly held views,
between the exigencies of the lex lata and the pressures for

119.
G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 98.
120.
Sloan-1989, supra note 105, at 121-22 (deeming the 1970 Declaration
an authentic interpretation); Schacter, supra note 109, at 3 (deeming the 1970
Declaration to be authoritative).
121.
One who casts such doubt is commentator Sir Ian Sinclair, the United
Kingdom's Representative to the Special Committee on Friendly Relations, who
was present during five of the six years in which the Declaration was developed.
See Sinclair, supra note 87, at 1 (providing autobiographical information).
Sinclair now characterizes the 1970 Declaration's all-important final paragraph,
see supra text accompanying note 113, as merely "an afterthought," tacked on
simply to encourage states to be "guided" in their relations by the Declaration's
principles. Sinclair, supra note 87, at 26. Further, he states that rather than
constituting an interpretation of existing law under the U.N. Charter, the
Declaration contains some formulations of lexferenda (statements of developing
law) alongside formulations of lex lata (existing law). Id. at 16. Sinclair cites other
commentators who agree that mere recommendations easily creep into the
supposedly law-declaring resolutions. See, e.g., id. at 17-18.
For further comments casting doubt on the law-making intent of certain
Western representatives with respect to the 1970 Declaration, see Cameron,
supra note 86, at 236 (noting the haste with which the Declaration was prepared
and the ongoing Western objections).
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recognition of an emerging lexferenda.... As such, it has all the
imperfections which a document of this nature night
12 2 be expected
to have.., and some quite deliberate ambiguities.

Even commentators who believe that some forms of economic
coercion are prohibited realize that the Declaration's language is
so general as to be virtually meaningless. 123 The language simply
concerns
"exercising
sovereign
rights"
and
"securing
advantages"12 4-themes that lie at the heart of virtually all forms
of international diplomacy.1 2 5 This language cannot provide any
12 6
clear standards to guide states in their foreign policy activity.
State Practice
State practice in relation to a negative norm, such as a norm
prohibiting the use of economic coercion, is inherently difficult to
assess. 1 27 Since 1983, however, the General Assembly has been

122. Sinclair, supra note 87, at 7. For a similar view see ELAGAB-1988,
supra note 80, at 208-209 (quoting a 1970 U.N. representative who stated that
the lack of precision precluded real application of the principles and permitted
"all sorts of abuse"); cf. 1970 U.N.Y.B. 787 (stating that the desired unanimity was
obtained only after a great deal of "subtle balancing" of the text).
123. See Richard B. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the "lNew International
Economic Order: A Second Look at Some FirstImpressions, 16 VA. J. INTl L. 233,
238 (finding the resolutions meaningless because they are too abstract); Bowett,
supra note 85, at 248 (finding the resolutions' language "so vague as to be
useless").
124. See supra text accompanying note 97 (quoting the Declaration).
125. Lillich, supra note 123, at 239 n. 29 (quoting Muir, The Boycott in
InternationalLaw, 9 J. INTL L. & ECON. 187, 204 (1974)). The 1970 Declaration,
rooted in the concept of sovereignty, remains problematic because sovereignty
can logically refer to one state's sovereign right to choose its trading partners just
as it can refer to another state's sovereign right to be free of economic coercion.
Cameron, supranote 86, at 235.
126. Lillich, supra note 123, at 238-39 n. 29 (quoting Boorman, The Arab
Oil Weapon and the Ensuing Juridical Issues, 9 J. INTrL L. & ECON. 205, 230
(1974)).
127. There are two reasons for this difficulty. First, observance of a
negative norm will result not in concrete evidence of action, but in unremarkable
inaction. See Sinclair, supra note 87, at 23. Sinclair says that this is why the
I.C.J.'s opinion in the Nicaragua case-dealing with the negative customary law
norm against the use of force-concentrates merely on state expressions of opinio
juris in General Assembly resolutions and seemingly ignores the element of state
action. Id.
Second, states using economic coercion will almost always articulate a reason
for the coercion. They must express their aims if they hope the coercion will
shape behavior in the target state and in other "misbehaving" states. See RICHARD
J. ELLINGS, EMBARGOES AND WORLD POWER: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

27 n.13 (1985) ("sanctions are necessarily public"). The problem is that the
stated reason will serve to depict the coercive behavior as a justifiable
countermeasure or reprisal. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
Thus, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether the coercing nation
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facilitating such assessments by issuing a steady stream of
resolutions entitled "Economic measures as a means of political

and

economic

coercion

against

developing

countries." 128

Ironically, the fact that eight such resolutions were deemed
necessary by the developing states since 1983 is evidence that no

norm prohibiting economic coercion had been in existence.1 2 9 The
voting patterns on these "economic coercion" resolutions show a
130
distinct split between developing and developed countries.
Without the continuing support in the form of state practice by
the economically powerful nations that would be most affected by

a norm prohibiting economic coercion, the past and present
resolutions concerning such a norm are rendered useless.'13
Outside the United Nations, state practice likewise shows
that no norm prohibiting

established by the

the use

of economic

1970 Declaration.' 3

2

coercion

was

Other commentators

considered itself bound by any norm against economic coercion in the absence of
the prior breach.
128. G.A. Res. 197, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., 104th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/39/197 (1983); G.A. Res. 210, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 104th plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/210 (1984); G.A. Res. 185, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 119th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/185 (1985); G.A. Res. 165, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., 96th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/165 (1987); G.A. Res. 173, U.N.
GAOR, 42d Sess., 96th plen. mtg., U.N. DOC. A/RES/42/173 (1987); G.A. Res.
215, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/215 (1989);
G.A. Res. 210 U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 79th plen. mtg., U.N. DOC. A/RES/46/210
(1991); G.A. Res. 168, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 86th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/168 (1993). These resolutions on economic coercion, the latest of
which was adopted in 1993, are not law-declaring; but, they 'reaffirm" the
language concerning economic coercion in the 1970 Declaration and the 1974
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 48/168
(1993). The operative sections pointedly "call upon" the international community
to adopt urgent measures "to eliminate the use by some developed countries of
unilateral economic coercive measures against developing countries. . . as a
means of forcibly imposing the will of one state on another." See, e.g., id. at 2.
129.
See Omer Elagab, Coercive Economic Measures Against Developing
Countries, 41 INTL & COMP. L. Q. 682-83 (1992) [hereinafter Elagab-1992]. Just
as General Assembly resolutions were used by the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua case to
avoid the problem of assessing state practice with respect to a negative norm, see
supra note 127, resolutions can be used here to show that the economically
powerful states do not feel bound by a norm against the use of economic coercion.
130.
1991 U.N.Y.B. 348 (providing the voting records for the 1991
resolution). The vote tally was 97 in favor and 30 opposed, with nine abstentions.
Among those voting against the resolution were Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Id. The U.S.S.R. was among
the abstentions. Id.
131.
See Schacter, supra note 109, at 3 ('a declaration will have diminished
authority as law if it is not observed by states particularly affected").
132. See Cameron, supra note 86, at 249 ('economic diplomacy is rampant
in the international community"); ELLINGS, supra note 127, at 152-53 (embargoes
have been "ubiquitous" in U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II).
Logically, one could argue that most instances of such economic coercion
were undertaken as reprisal instead of as retorsion and, therefore, such reprisals
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have listed pre-Declaration1 33 and post-Declaration instances of
the use of economic coercion by many, including the United
States, the United Kingdom, the European Community, the
U.S.S.R., and the Arab states. 13 Perhaps most notably, the Arab
Oil
Embargo-carried
out
by
developing
countries

themselves-occurred
Declaration. 1 3
Together

only

three

years

after

the

1970

5

with

the

eight

recent

resolutions

concerning

"coercive measures against developing countries," such state
practice indicates the non-existence of a legal norm prohibiting
the use of economic coercion.
C. GATT & OAS Charter
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) appears
to be a logical place to find a prohibition of economic coercion.
Yet, as Article XXI 13 6 makes GATT inapplicable to trade measures
undertaken for security reasons, GATT designedly does not cover
many situations of economic coercion.1 3 7 A 1986 GATT tribunal
do not undermine a norm prohibiting unfettered economic coercion. However,
experts appear to agree that the pervasive use of economic coercion demonstrates
the lack of a norm prohibiting economic coercion. See infra text accompanying
note 152.
133. To the extent that nations practiced economic coercion before the 1970
Declaration, the Declaration's evidentiary value as establishing a norm
prohibiting the use of economic coercion is weakened. Just as the Declaration
itself is evidence, such pre-Declaration state practice is useful evidence in
interpreting the Charter. Cf. RESTATEMENr (THIRD), supra note 93, § 325(2) & cmt.
c. (indicating that state practice is relevant to interpreting international
agreements).
134.
See Cameron, supra note 86, at 241-45 (compiling and analyzing postWWII uses of economic diplomacy); ELAGAB-1988, supra note 80, at 682-83
(discussing several examples of the use of post-Declaration economic coercion).
135.
See Cameron, supra note 86, at 244 (discussing the 1973 Arab Oil
Embargo).
136.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947, art. XXI [hereinafter

GATT]. Note that this analysis relates directly to GATT-1947. However, from the
Uruguay Round, it appears that GAIT-1994, made no significant changes with
respect to economic coercion. See generally GATT SECRETARIAT, RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1994) (providing a
compilation of GATT-1994 documents and revealing no apparent changes to
Article XXI).
137.
See Report of the Expert Group Meeting, in AGENDA IEM 82(b), U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/44/510 (1989); Richard S. White,
The Politics of Procedure: An Examinationof the GATT Dispute Settlement Panel and
the Article XXI Defense in the Context of the U.S. Embargo of Nicaragua, 19 LAW &
POL'Y INT L BUS. 603, 631 (1987) (stating that GATT currently is filled with
uncertainties and loopholes with respect to economic coercion). The Report of the
Expert Group, supra, contains a great deal of information about the status of the
legal concept of economic coercion. The expert group meeting was convened in
Geneva from May 1 to 3, 1989, pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 42/173
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ruled that the United States embargo against Nicaragua fell under
the Article XXI loophole 138 and was not prohibited by GATT. 13 9
Significantly, the U.S. was not even required to argue its
"security"-based reasons for the embargo. 14° Thus, the Nicaragua

case confirms one commentator's view that the usefulness of
GATT ends right where most instances of economic coercion
begin. 1 4 1 After the decision of the dispute panel, some smaller

nations called for GATT reform, suggesting that it cover such

situations in the future. 14 2

Similarly, some experts expressed

hope that the Uruguay Round would produce changes with
respect to economic coercion. 14 3 Economically powerful nations,
however, appear to agree that GAIT should not cover such
situations, 14 4 and the Uruguay Round appears to have produced
14
no changes with respect to economic coercion.
Unlike the U.N. Charter text, which does not mention
coercive economic measures, Article 18 of the OAS Charter does
contain language that closely parallels that in the 1970
Declaration relating to economic coercion. 146 Although used in a
treaty, instead of simply in a declaration, this language is just as

of December 11, 1987 (one of the resolutions dealing with economic coercion
against developing countries). Id. at 8.
138. The loophole is that GATT explicitly does not apply to trade measures
undertaken for security reasons. See GATT-1947, art. XXI.
139.
See U.S. Embargo on NicaraguaDid Not Violate Obligationsunder GATT,
Dispute Panel Rules, 3 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at pp. 1368-69 (Nov. 12,
1986).
140.
See Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of GATT, 12 MICH. J.
INr1L L. 558, 609 (1991) (discussing the "terms of reference," under which the
United States agreed to send the dispute to the panel).
141.
Cameron, supranote 86, at 246-47.
142.
See Int'l Trade Rep., supranote 139, at 1368-69.
143.
Report of the Expert Group Meeting, supranote 137, at 12.
144.
See U.S., Nicaragua Unsuccessful in Getting GATT Action on Trade
Embargo Dispute, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 765 (June 5, 1985). Canada
and the European Community agreed with the United States that a GATT council
is not the place to debate a national security question. Id.
145.
See supra note 136. If, hypothetically, the Article XXI loophole were
ever closed to the extent that the United States was forced to argue its security
based reasons for the embargo, the United States would still have a plausible
argument for considering Cuba a security threat. The U.S. argument would
simply be that as long as a repressive Castro regime stays in power, refugees
present a security problem for the southern coast of the United States. See supra
notes 4-6 and accompanying text (providing details of the refugee crisis of August
1994).
146.
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, CHARTER art. 19 (stating that "[n]o
state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or
political character in order to force the sovereign will of another and obtain from it
advantages of any kind").
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vague.1 4 7 Thus, it is subject to the same criticisms as the 1970
Declaration. 148 If a regional prohibition of economic coercion
ever existed, repeated instances of U.S. economic coercion of
Latin American
14 9
meaningless.

nations

have

undoubtedly

rendered

it

D. Cold War EraProducedNo ClearNorm
In conclusion, while a number of commentators have tried to
devise a workable legal definition of economic coercion, 150
presently no useful concept of economic coercion exists.15 1 After
convening an international panel of experts in 1989 to study ways
to eliminate economic coercion, the U.N. Secretary-General
authoritatively reported in 1993 that "there is no clear consensus
in international law as to when coercive measures are improper,
despite relevant treaties, declarations, and resolutions adopted in
international organizations which try to develop norms limiting
2

15
the use of such measures."
Yet, during the 1990s, Cuba pushed the issue of economic
coercion to the fore in the United Nations General Assembly in an

147.
coercion)
related to
148.
149.
of a norm

Compare supra note 146 (OAS Charter's language relating to economic
with supra text accompanying note 97 (1970 Declaration's language
economic coercion).
See supranotes 122-26 and accompanying text.
Cf. Schacter, supra note 109, at 3 (indicating that the lack of support
by the nations most affected by it severely undermines the value of the

norm).

150. Professor David Bowett's theory, which examines the coercing nation's
intent and the subsequent effect on the target, is perhaps the most well-known.
Bowett, supra note 77; see also Bowett, supra note 85, at 248. Professor Omer
Elagab has more recently suggested a similar theory. Elagab-1992, supra note
129, at 693-94 (emphasizing the factors of the coercer's intent and impact on the
target). Another commentator has suggested the adoption of an antitrust model,
which takes into account market share and ideas of unfair competition.
Cameron, supranote 86, at 251-52.
151.
ELAGAB-1988, supra note 80, at 208 ("the principle of non-intervention
has not crystallized into a clear rule prohibiting non-intervention"); Bowett, supra
note 85, at 248 (the language in the resolutions is "so vague as to be useless");
Cameron, supranote 86, at 253-54 (legal regulation of economic coercion is one
of the most unclear areas of international law).
152.
Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion
Against Developing Countries: Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., Agenda Item 91(a), at 1, U.N. Doc. A/48/535 (1993). This 1993 Note by
the Secretary-General summarizes the expert panel's report on ways to eliminate
economic coercion.
The Secretary-General's note recognizes that the
international legai system also lacks adequate mechanisms to monitor economic
coercion. Id. at 1-2. Thus, it recommends that the United Nations and member
states work toward developing the concept of economic coercion as well as
developing a capacity to deal with such coercive measures. Id.
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effort to increase the pressure on the United States to end its
long-standing embargo.

V.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE EMBARGO, 1991-1994

Even if a General Assembly resolution is not law-declaring, it
can play an important role in the development of future
international law, as well as present international relations.
Resolutions concerning normative principles, at a minimum,
serve to test the international attitude as to whether "classical"
codification through the International Law Commission is within
the realm of possibility. 1' But even beyond any such reference to
international law, resolutions certainly express moral judgments
15 4
and world opinion about particular incidents and disputes.
Like international law, such judgments and opinions have the
potential to influence the behavior of states.15 5 In reality, those
moral judgments and world opinions can serve as seeds for the
development of future international law. 15 6 Thus, while the
resolutions entitled "The necessity of ending the . .. embargo by
the United States of America against Cuba" do not purport to be
law-declaring, an analysis of the text of the resolutions, the
positions of significant parties, and nations' explanations for their
votes reveals a great deal about the post-Cold War status of an
international legal norm concerning economic coercion. 157 This
section of the Note conducts such an analysis, and concludes that
there has been little or no post-Cold War movement toward a
norm concerning economic coercion.

153.
See Sinclair, supranote 87, at 8 (relating the view of G.G. Fitzmaurice,
The Future of Public International Law, LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE 1873-1973 of the

Institut de Droit International, at 233).
154.

Sloan-1988, supranote 102, at 109, 124.

155. See id. at 109 (stating that resolutions concerning specific disputes will
affect the conduct of the disputants as well as the attitudes and conduct of third
states); id. at 123 (describing the important nonlegal effects that resolutions can
have on states).
156.
Id. at 108 (quoting Professor Dupuy, who states that even
recommendatory resolutions "affirm 'a legitimacy which anticipates the legality of
tomorrow'). Vague legal norms and developing legal norms, which cannot
accurately be said to involve binding legal obligations, are often characterized as
"soft law." Id. at 106-08.
157. The analysis examines the factors that Professor Sloan considers
important in determining the effect of General Assembly resolutions: the terms
used, the intent of voting members as manifested in explanatory statements, the
voting patterns, and state practice. See generally id. at 125-38.
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A. Analysis of the United States Position
Unlike most other Western powers,1 5 8 the United States has
chosen to treat the resolution presented by Cuba in each of the
last three years as a referendum on the legitimacy of the longstanding embargo. Despite this attitude, the U.S. position has
evolved in legally significant ways. By 1994, the United States
had essentially adopted de Vattel's classic stance that nations are
free to conduct their trade relations in any way they see fit. 15 9
Before reaching that stance, however, the U.S. ambassador to the
United Nations came dangerously close, in 1993 and especially in
1992, to suggesting that the United States accept the existence of
a legal norm prohibiting the use of economic coercion.
As
explained in Part IV, acceptance of the existence of such a norm
would turn the embargo into a countermeasure, 160 requiring the
United States to articulate substantial justifications for
maintaining it.
Further justification would be unnecessary,
however, as long as the United States categorizes the embargo as
1 61
retorsion.
1. The U.S. Position in 1992
Before the General Assembly voted on Cuba's resolution in
1992, the U.S. ambassador asserted that the General Assembly
should not be involved in this bilateral matter.1 62 Explaining the
general embargo policy, the ambassador said that the United
States "chooses" not to trade with Cuba for good reasons.163
First, Cuba nationalized billions of dollars worth of U.S. nationals'
property in the early 1960s, and has not made reasonable
restitution.164 Thus, he labelled the U.S. policy a "legitimate
response" to this unreasonable behavior.1 65 Second, according to
the ambassador, Cuba's repressive political regime has denied the

Cuban people basic human rights and democratic freedoms. 166

158.
See infra Parts V-B(2) to V-B(5) (presenting the views of the Western
powers with respect to the resolutions). The Western powers focused not on the
long-standing embargo, but on the recently enacted CDA. Id.
159.
See De Vattel's position, supra Part IV-A.
160. For a discussion and definition of the legal term "countermeasure," see
supranotes 77-82 and accompanying text.
161.
For discussion and definition of the legal term "retorsion," see id.
162.
Provisional Verbatim Record of the 70th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., at 73-76, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.70 (Prov. ed. 1992) [hereinafter Provisional
Verbatim Record-1992] (statement of the U.S. Ambassador).
163. Id. at 73-75.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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In characterizing the U.S. position as a "response" to Cuba's
illegal behavior, the U.S. ambassador risked signaling to the
international community that the United States felt bound by a
legal norm prohibiting economic coercion in the absence of the
prior breach of law by Cuba. In other words, he could be seen as
characterizing the U.S. embargo as a countermeasure.
The
problem with the ambassador's language is obvious in light of the
I.C.J.'s comments in 1986:
If a State acts in a way primafade incompatible with a recognized
rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or
justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not
the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the

significance
of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the
16 7
rule.
If the Cuban embargo case were to appear before the I.C.J., the
court could potentially build upon such signs of U.S. acceptance
of the norm to establish a customary legal norm prohibiting
economic coercion. The I.C.J. could then rule on whether the
United States had complied with all the conditions required for
the use of countermeasures. 168 Such independent review of U.S.
foreign policy decisions seems to be exactly what the United
States would want to avoid.
If the case of the Cuban embargo were to appear before the
I.C.J.,
the United States could counterargue
that its
ambassador's 1992 statement merely explained U.S. reasons for
engaging in an act of retorsion.
The United States would
emphasize the ambassador's language about how the United
States "chooses" not to trade with Cuba, asserting that it is free to
"choose" to trade with whomever it wishes.
But, given the
ambassador's unqualified 1992 language about the United States
responding to Cuba's illegality, the United States would, in the
absence of other evidence, face an uphill battle.
2. The U.S. Position in 1993
Very prudently, the United States attempted to modify its
position before the General Assembly in 1993. In a change from
1992, the ambassador spoke of a "political and economic right to
exclude as trading partners" those who violate fundamental
human rights and show disrespect for human dignity. 16 9 Closer

167. Military and Paramilitary Activities, supranote 88, at 98.
168. For a discussion of the conditions on countermeasures, see ELAGAB1988, supranote 80, at 10-36.
169. U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 48th Plen. Mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. A/48/PV.48
(1993) [hereinafter 48th Plenary Meeting-1993] (statement of the U.S.
ambassador).
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to de Vattel's classic position, this language emphasizes a right to
choose trading partners without mentioning any specific illegal
behavior by Cuba.17 0 References to Cuba's illegal nationalizations
were conspicuously absent. 171
Yet, even without using the word "illegal," the United States
still portrayed Cuban behavior as wrongful and the embargo as a
reaction to that wrongful behavior. Thus, the ambassador,
arguably, still implied that the United States feels bound by a
legal norm against the use of economic coercion, a norm from
which the United States is exempted with respect to Cuba
72
because of Cuba's disrespect for fundamental human rights. 1
The United States would argue that the ambassador's 1993
citation of Cuba's human rights abuses was not meant to be an
articulation of a legal defense. Rather, the ambassador was
simply explaining U.S. policy reasons for maintaining the longstanding embargo. Even if the embargo is perfectly legal, such a
public explanation of U.S. policy is necessary for at least two
reasons. First, economic coercion cannot function effectively as a
foreign policy device without being accompanied by an
articulation of its ultimate object. 173 In the absence of such an
articulation, the coercing nation simply cannot expect the target
17 4
to react in the desired manner.
Second, the General Assembly is not a legal forum.
Members' votes on non-law-declaring resolutions may be based
not just on legal factors but also on moral concerns and other
factors, including purely political grounds.' 7 5 It is, therefore,

unnecessary

to view the ambassador's comments

as an

170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Commentators have raised the issue of the justifiability of
countermeasures taken against human rights abuses. See Elagab-1992, supra
note 129, at 693-94; Report of the Expert Group Meeting, supra note 137, at 11
(noting briefly that some of the attending experts favored the human rights
justification, while others feared it would provide too big a loophole for otherwise
illegal conduct).
173.
Cf. ELLINGS, supra note 127, at 27 n.13. (explaining that economic
coercion can serve the dual goals of altering the behavior of the target and
deterring others from engaging in similar behavior, both of which are best served
by public articulation of the coercer's objectives).
174.
Id
175.
See Sloan-1988, supra note 102, at 123-24.
Indeed, the U.S.
ambassador pointed out the political implications of the vote. He emphasized
that Castro had cited the 1992 resolution as a victory for his revolution and had
used the resolution as an excuse not to reform his repressive government. See
48th Plenary Meeting-1993, supra note 169, at 13. According to the ambassador,
if the United States were to lift the embargo now, the United States would be left
with no means to pressure Cuba for improvements concerning human rights and
democratic freedoms. Id.
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articulation of a legal defense. To the extent that the statement
addressed members' moral or political concerns, it serves as
evidence that economic coercion and the embargo are, on some
level, suspect in the international community. 17 6 But, it is not

surprising that there is a moral norm or "soft law" prohibiting the

1 77
use of economic coercion.
At a minimum, the 1993 U.S. statement indicates that the
United States felt bound by moral norms or by soft law with
respect to economic coercion. Based on the two aforementioned
reasons, however, the United States could plausibly argue that its
statement does not indicate that the United States felt bound by a
legal norm.

3. The U.S. Position in 1994
On the day of the 1994 vote, the U.S. ambassador again
portrayed the Castro regime as continuing to flout human
rights.' 7 8
But, rather than characterizing the embargo as a
justifiable response to Cuba's illegal behavior, the U.S.
ambassador issued a statement that closely parallels de Vattel's
classic stance: "The United States, like any other nation, has the
sovereign right to determine its bilateral relationships, including

176. Cf. supra text accompanying note 167 (I.C.J.'s statement that the
unqualified articulation of an explanation for conduct demonstrates the state's
acceptance of external constraints on its conduct).
177. Professor Sloan's attempt to define "soft law" perfectly describes the
status of a norm against the use of economic coercion. Sloan-1988, supra note
102, at 107-08 (stating that soft law may simply be a norm with an uncertain

status or vague content, or a norm that is unenforceable in court).
Sloan goes on to make the point that moral concerns and "soft law" may be
the first step on the way toward the formation of a legal norm. Id. at 108, 123.
However, the mere existence of a moral or soft law norm does not necessarily
indicate movement toward a legal norm. Rather, the proper role of some moral or
soft law norms may be to guide an individual actor in a sensitive matter without
involving the theoretical legal enforcement power of a political superior. The
existence of a moral norm, or of soft law with respect to economic coercion, may
simply mean that a legal norm is inappropriate in that area. For an explanation
of why a legal norm may be inappropriate for economic coercion, see note 320
and accompanying text.
178. 45th Plenary Meeting, Wednesday, 26 October 1994 At 10 am., New
York, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/49/PV.45 (1993)[hereinafter
45th Plenary Meeting-1994](statement of the U.S. ambassador). The statement
noted recent evidence of a crackdown on human rights in August 1994 and cited
the summer exodus of Cubans toward Florida as evidence of increasing
dissatisfaction with the Castro regime. Further, the United States deplored the
absence of a statement in the resolution, similar to that of the Rio Group in
September, encouraging Cuba to make a peaceful transition to democratic
freedoms and respect for human rights. Id.; see also U.S. Urged to Lift Its Embargo
in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, sect.l, at 8 (describing the statement of the
Rio Group of Latin American and Caribbean presidents).
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its trading partners." 17 9 The U.S. ambassador then simply stated
that a review of the embargo's status depended upon Cuba's
movement toward democracy and toward international norms
regarding human rights.1 8 0 No language hinted that the United
States acknowledged the existence of a legal norm against
economic coercion. 181
Using the right to choose trading partners as the legal basis
for the embargo, the United States had finally taken the position
that the embargo was an act of retorsion.
B. Analysis of the Cuban Positionand of the Positionsof Other
Voting Members: Were There Any Developments Related to
Economic Coercionor the Long-StandingEmbargo?
Cuba's original 1991 draft resolution and Cuban statements
in each of the following years demonstrate that Cuba's ultimate
goal is to obtain a declaration that the entire embargo is an illegal
act of economic coercion. Yet, the resolutions adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1992, 1993, and 1994 deal primarily
with the Cuban Democracy Act's extraterritorial measures, and,
thus, represent a softened, fallback position as compared to the
1991 resolution. Indeed, when explaining their votes of 1992,
1993, and 1994, many U.N. members carefully distinguished
their stance on the CDA's extraterritorial measures from their
stance on the long-standing embargo itself. Thus, the following

analysis 1 82 reveals little evidence of post-Cold War movement
toward a legal norm against
surprisingly, little evidence of a
long-standing embargo itself.
Assembly begin to show possible

economic coercion and, more
shift in world opinion about the
Only in 1994 did the General
signs of change.

1. The Draft Resolution of 1991
In 1991, the year that the embargo was first placed on the
General Assembly's agenda, Cuba's efforts were directed primarily
at having the U.S. embargo condemned as illegal economic
coercion. Cuba directly alleged that the embargo was aimed at
"imposing on it the political, social, and economic order which the

179.
180.
181.

45th PlenaryMeeting-1994, supranote 178, at 11.
Id.
Id. at 11-12.

182. As stated at the beginning of this section, the analysis vill concern the
text of the resolutions, the positions of the parties, and nations' explanations for
their votes. See supranote 157 and accompanying text.
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United States authorities consider most fitting." 183 Although the

Cuban argument briefly referred to extraterritorial measures that
violate the sovereignty of third party states, it focused on the

violation of Cuban "sovereignty" and the Charter's "principle of
18 4

non-intervention."
After the embargo was placed on the agenda, Cuba issued a
document in

October 1991 that emphasized both the embargo's
185

18 6

With
and its economic coercion.
extraterritorial measures
the controversial provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act still a
the
allegations
of
away
from
becoming
law,
year
extraterritoriality 18 7 were a bit premature. But, Cuba forcefully
stated in the document that U.S. "economic coercion" violated
norms that are "universally acknowledged to have attained the
status of binding international law."18 8 In support of its position,
Cuba cited the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, the GATT,
18 9
and the OAS Charter.
The draft resolution that Cuba presented to the General
Assembly in November 1991 focused directly on economic
coercion.190
The preamble "recall[s]" the language related to
economic coercion in the 1965 Declaration on Intervention and

183. Explanatory Memorandum, in Letter Dated 16 August 1991 from the
PermanentRepresentativeof Cuba Addressed to the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR,
46th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/46/193 (1991) [hereinafter Explanatory
Memo]. A subsequent document from the Latin American Parliament, submitted
in support of Cuba, highlighted the "relaxing of cold war tensions" as a timely
reason for ending the embargo. Resolution passed by the 13th Regular General
Assembly of the Latin American Parliamenton 2 August 1991, in Letter Dated 16
August 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba Addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/46/193/Add.1 (1991).
184. Explanatory Memo, supra note 183, at 2-3.
185.
Letter Dated 25 October 1991 from the Charge d'Affairs a.i of the
Permanent Mission of Cuba for the United Nations Addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 142, at 3-5, U.N. Doc.
A/46/599 (1991).
186. Id. at 5-6.
187.
Id. at 5 (emphasizing that the United States would not allow U.S.controlled companies located overseas to make investments in Cuba or to finance
trade activities or joint ventures in Cuba).
188.
Id. at6.
189.
Id. at 5-6. The document also cited the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. Id. at 6. Other commentators have explained how a portion of that
treaty relates to economic coercion. See, e.g., ELAGAB-1988, supra note 80, at
153-64.
See Necessity of Ending the Economic Commercial and Financial
190.
EmbargoImposed by the United States of America Against Cuba, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Only one
Sess., Agenda Item 142, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/46/L.20 (1991).
preambular paragraph, the sixth of seven, discussed extraterritorial measures.
Id. The rest of the preambular paragraphs concerned economic coercion and the
three-decade-old embargo. Id.
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the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations. 19 1 Then, in explicit
terms, the draft resolution indicates "that for more than 30 years,
a series of economic, commercial, and financial measures and

actions has been applied against Cuba," harming the Cuban

people and infringing upon Cuba's sovereignty. 19 The operative
section of the resolution pointedly declares that "that policy
contradicts principles embodied in the Charter of the United
1 93
Nations and in international law."
Prior to the passage of the CDA's controversial provisions, the
General Assembly, however, refused to accept Cuba's draft
resolution.194 Deciding to withdraw the resolution rather than
risk defeat, the Cuban ambassador delivered an impassioned
speech on November 11, 1991, blaming the United States for
intimidating possible supporters of the resolution. 1 95 Analysis in
the following subsections confirms that the General Assembly
simply was not ready to recognize the embargo as illegal economic
coercion.
2. The Resolution of 1992
a. Developments Outside the United Nations
Before the November 1992 vote on the embargo, two
noteworthy events occurred. First, on December 21, 1991, the
Soviet Union officially dissolved.1 9 6 Second, on October 23, 1992,
President George Bush signed the controversial Cuban Democracy
Act. 19 7 Both events undoubtedly impacted the mood of the
General Assembly. But it was the CDA that gave Cuba a powerful
new angle for its resolution and the CDA that so angered the rest

191.
192.

Id.
Id.

193.

Id.

194.

See Stanley Meisler, U.N. Rebuffs U.S. on Cuba Embargo, L.A. TIMES,

Nov. 25, 1992, at Al ("many governments-under American pressure-persuaded
Cuba to withdraw it [in 1991]'); G.A. Decision 46/407, 46th mtg., 13 Nov. 1994
(deciding to defer consideration of the resolution and to include it in the
provisional agenda for the 47th session).
195.

46th PlenaryMeeting, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 46th Plen. mtg. at 16-18,

U.N. Doc. A/46/PV.46 (1991) (statement of the Cuban ambassador). The Cuban
ambassador rejected the notion that the embargo was related to the Cold War,
instead characterizing it as simply one example of the historical domination of
Cuba by the United States. Id. at 19-20 (citing evidence from as far back as the
early 19th century).
196.
David Remnick, In New Commonwealth of 'Equals;Russia Remains the
DominantForce; HistoricalStatus, Space-Age Arms Ensure Regional Primacy, WASH.
POST, Dec. 22, 1991, at A39.
See infra Part III.
197.
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of the world that even long-standing allies abandoned the United
States in the 1992 vote.
b. The Cuban Position
Cuba balanced its argument by concentrating both on the
CDA's controversial measures and on economic coercion in
general. In some of the documents that were most damaging to
the United States, representatives of the European Community
(EC) stated that certain CDA provisions were unacceptable as a
matter of law and policy, and were contrary to long-standing rules
of international shipping. 198 At the same time, Cuba continued to
argue unabashedly that economic coercion itself is illegal under
specific declarations, resolutions, and treaties including, for
example, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, the 1974
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the OAS
Charter, and GATT. 19 9
In a dramatic speech on November 24, 1992, just before the
vote on Cuba's new 1992 version of the resolution, the Cuban
ambassador presented a balanced strategy. 2 ° ° With respect to
free trade, the ambassador portrayed the CDA as a U.S. attempt
to usurp not only the sovereignty of Cuba, but also the
sovereignty of the international community as a whole. 2 0 ' As the
speech progressed, he concentrated more on the long-standing
embargo itself. He deplored the U.S. action as anachronistic "in a
2°2
world where East-West contradictions no longer exist."
Further, he compared U.S. coercion of Cuba under the CDA to the

198. Note of April 7, 1992, supra note 65; D~marche of April 18, 1990, supra
note 65.
199.
For a particularly well-organized statement of Cuba's 1992 position,
including citations to many legal documents, see Necessity of Ending The
Economic, Commercial and FinancialEmbargo Imposed by the U.S. Against Cuba, in
Letter Dated 24 August 1992 from the Charge d'Affairs a.i of the Permanent

Mission of Cuba for the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-Genera U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex, Agenda, Item 39 of the Provisional Agenda, Annex, at
3-7, U.N. Doc. A/47/400 (1992). This document cites U.S. legislation, U.S.
regulations, the U.N. Charter, General Assembly resolutions, and treaties such as
GATT and the OAS Charter. Id. Beyond repeating the specific arguments made
in 1991, this document adds analysis about the denunciation of economic
coercion in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, id. at 6, and the
prohibition of economic coercion under specific provisions of the GATT. Id. at 67. Concerning GAIT, Cuba said that the United States can no longer even attempt
to portray Cuba as a security threat to justify violations of GATT provisions. Id. at

7.
200. ProvisionalVerbatim Record-1992, supranote 162, at 3-4.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 12. The Cuban ambassador emphasized that Cuba could no
longer rely on the support of the old socialist trading bloc. Id.
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20 3
historical U.S. coercion of Cuba under the Platt Amendment.
After emphasizing the harsh impact of the embargo on the Cuban
people, he concluded by asserting that the United Nations is the
appropriate forum for addressing the situation in which a small

country is suffering "aggression, against the rule of law, at the
°
hand of a great power." 20

c. Language of the Resolution
The resolution was approved by a margin of fifty-nine to
three, with seventy-one abstentions.20 5 Cuba seemed to have a
victory. Certainly, victory was undeniable with respect to the
controversial measures of the CDA. Moreover, members of the
press, apparently looking no further than the title of the
resolution, stated that Cuba had won condemnation of the longstanding embargo. 2 ° 6
But in reality, the text of the 1992
resolution deals almost exclusively with the CDA and the
extraterritoriality issue, not with the embargo itself.2 ° 7 The 1992

203.
Id. at 15-16. For details concerning the Platt Amendment, see supra
note 17.
204. Id. at 20.
205.
1992 U.N.Y.B. 234-35 (providing the voting records).
206.
See, e.g., Frank Prial, U.N. Votes to Urge U.S. to Dismantle Embargo on
Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992, at Al. Significantly, most members of the press
totally misconceived the specific nature of the U.N. votes. The New York Times
writer boldly, but irresponsibly, stated that the 1992 resolution "calls for an end
to the 30 year embargo against Cuba." The resolution does absolutely nothing of
the sort. Again, the resolution represents a fallback position after a 1991
resolution calling for an end to the embargo was withdrawn for lack of support.
At the beginning of its story on the 1992 resolution, the Los Angeles Times
actually indicated that the General Assembly's criticism was directed at the
"latest" embargo against Castro, in other words, directed at the CDA. Meisler,
supra note 194. Such an important distinction between the CDA and the longstanding embargo is easy to miss even in the Los Angeles Times article, and has
been completely ignored by most other members of the press as they have
reported on subsequent U.N. resolutions spanning from 1992 to 1994.
207.
The following is the full text of G.A. Res. 47/19, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., Agenda Item 39, 70th plen. mtg, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/19 (1992):
Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo
imposed by the United States of America against Cuba
The General Assembly,
Determined, to encourage strict compliance with the purposes and
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,
Reaffirming, among other principles, the sovereign equality of States,
non-intervention and non-interference in their internal affairs and freedom
of trade and international navigation, which are also enshrined in many
international legal instruments.
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resolution's preamble, clearly referring to the CDA, states that the
General Assembly is acting after "having learned" of certain recent
measures aimed at strengthening the embargo. 20 8 Further, the
preamble specifically states that the General Assembly is
concerned with "laws and regulations whose extraterritorial
effects" impact the sovereignty of states as well as the freedom of
trade and navigation. 2° 9 There is absolutely no mention of the
General Assembly's famous resolutions from the 1960s and 1970s
that speak of economic coercion; nor is the word coercion ever
used. 21 0 The key operative sections of the resolution simply call
for a repeal of those laws referred to in the preamble-in other
2 11
words, the CDA-that affect "freedom of trade and navigation."
In sum, the language of the 1992 resolution merely reflected the
General Assembly's reaction to the CDA and did not make any
statement about economic coercion or even about the propriety of
the long-standing embargo.

Concerned about the promulgation and application by Member
States of laws and regulations whose extraterritorial effects affect the
sovereignty of other States and the legitimate interests of entities or
persons under their jurisdiction, as well as the freedom of trade and
navigation,
Having learned of the recent promulgation of measures of that nature

aimed at strengthening and extending the economic, commercial and
financial embargo against Cuba,
1.
Calls upon all States to refrain from promulgating and
applying laws and measures of the kind referred to in the preamble to the
present resolution in conformity with their obligations under the Charter
of the United Nations and international law and with the commitments
that they have freely entered into in acceding to international legal
instruments that, interalia, reaffirm the freedom of trade and navigation.
2.
Urges States that have such laws or measures to take the
necessary steps to repeal or invalidate them as soon as possible in
accordance with their legal regime;
3.
Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General
Assembly at its forty-eighth session a report on the implementation of the
present resolution;
Decides to include the item in the provisional agenda of its
4.
forty-eighth session.
208.
Id.
209. Id.
Id. In the second preambular paragraph, references to the general
210.
principles of "non-intervention" and "non-interference" in internal affairs do not
relate to economic coercion against Cuba. Those terms, in context, relate to all
states' "freedom of trade and navigation," which is mentioned later in that second
paragraph, and to the extraterritorial measures described in the third preambular
paragraph. Again, the resolution cites none of the traditional declarations
concerning economic coercion.
211. Id.
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d. Positions of Other U.N. Members
During the 1992 voting explanations period, U.N. members
took a variety of positions. Some definitely spoke out against U.S.
For example, the Vietnamese
use of economic coercion.
attempt to
the U.S.
ambassador vehemently denounced
subordinate Cuba's will. 2 12 The Iraqi ambassador even labeled the
embargo a form of aggression.2 13 These were extreme versions of
2 14
the sentiments articulated on behalf of the nonaligned
countries by the Indonesian ambassador. 21 5 Expressing concern
for the suffering of the Cuban people and for Cuban economic
the
explained
ambassador
the
Indonesian
development,
nonaligned nations' belief that economic sanctions can "only
2 16
aggravate" the situation.
Significantly, though not surprisingly, this group of
nonaligned states, which condemned the long-standing embargo,
is virtually the same group that has supported the series of
resolutions dating back to 1983 that call for an end to economic
coercion against developing countries. 2 17 Their stance on

212. ProvisionalVerbatim Record-1992, supranote 162, at 38-42 (statement
of the Vietnamese ambassador).
213. Id. at 51 (statement of the Iraqi ambassador).
214. The Nonaligned Movement (NAM) originated in 1961, when 25 nations
met at the first Conference of Nonaligned Heads of State. ARTHUR S. BANKS, ED.,
POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1994-1995 1077 (1995). Organized largely
through the initiative of Yugoslavian President Josip Tito, the NAM initially
concerned itself with the accelerating arms race between the superpowers. Id.
There have been a total of ten conferences since 1961, the most recent of which
was in Jakarta, Indonesia, in September, 1992. Id. at 1076. The focus of the
group has shifted over the years to the advocacy of "occasionally radical
solutions' for world economic and other problems. Id. at 1077. Thus, in 1973
there were calls for concerted action by "poor nations against the industrialized
world." Id. The 1992 Conference produced a call for more constructive dialogue
between developing and developed nations, but still asked developed nations to
give "urgent priority" to establishing "a more equitable global economy." Id. at
1077-78.
215. Id. at 33 (statement of the Indonesian ambassador).
216. Id.
217. Compare 1991 U.N.Y.B. 348 (providing a list of those who voted in
favor of the 1991 resolution on economic coercion against developing
countries) with BANKS, supranote 214, at 1076 (providing a list of members of
the Nonaligned Movement). For a list of the eight resolutions on economic
coercion against developing countries and, for a description of their content,
see supra note 124.
One notable addition to the list of nations voting to condemn the longstanding embargo as illegal was the Russian Federation. Provisional Verbatim
Record-1992, supra note 162, at 83-85 (statement of the Russian Federation
ambassador). Although the Russian ambassador abstained from voting in 1992,
he indicated that, from a "legal viewpoint," Russia did not view economic coercion
as a proper means for encouraging observance of human rights or movement
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economic coercion has been a constant for at least a decade, well
back into the Cold War era.2 18 Thus, their 1992 condemnation of
the embargo cannot serve as evidence of any new movement
toward a norm prohibiting the use of economic coercion, 2nor
19
would it change the 1986 I.C.J. opinion in the Nicaragua case.
Angry at the United States for enacting the extraterritorial
legislation, the world's economically powerful nations also refused
to support the U.S. in the vote. 22 0 Their reasons, however, were
entirely different from those of the nonaligned, developing
nations. Voting for the resolution (and against the U.S.), the
Canadian delegate specifically stated that his vote did not relate
to the dispute referred to in the resolution's title, but was instead
intended to express disapproval of the extraterritorial measures of
the CDA. 2 2 1 While avoiding any criticism of the long-standing
embargo, the ambassador from the United Kingdom, speaking on
behalf of the European Community, also expressed strong
opposition to the extraterritorial measures that force third party
states to implement foreign policy.2 2 2 He characterized the longstanding embargo as a bilateral measure to be worked out by the
Japan explained its abstention
United States and Cuba.2 23
simply by expressing an appreciation for the concerns of third
the resolution could be of
party states, while querying2 2whether
4
any real help in the dispute.
These statements of the world economic powers reinforced
what was already clear from an examination of the text of the
resolution: the 1992 vote provided no evidence of movement
toward acceptance of a norm against economic coercion, nor did it
provide evidence of any increase in international disapproval of
toward democracy. Id. Today, of course, Russia is in a position to receive
economic coercion from the United States.
218. See 1983 U.N.Y.B. 412-13 (providing voting records that are virtually
identical to the 1991 records on the resolution of the same name).
See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (describing the I.C.J.'s
219.
ruling that the U.S. embargo against Nicaragua did not violate the customary law
of non-intervention).
1992 U.N.Y.B. 234-35 (providing voting records). Canada and France
220.

were the two notable economic powers that voted in favor of the resolution
(against the United States), while the remainder of the European Community and
Japan simply abstained. Id. at 235.
Provisional Verbatim Record-I 992, supra note 162, at 86 (statement of
221.

the Canadian ambassador).
222. Id. at 79-81 (statement of the British ambassador). On behalf of the
EC, the British ambassador plainly stated that such measures violate
international law. Id.
223. Id. at 81. The statement added the EC's support for peaceful
transition to democracy within Cuba.
224. ProvisionalVerbatim Record of the 71st Meeting, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
71st mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.71 (1992) (statement of the Japanese
ambassador).
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the long-standing embargo against Cuba. The vote simply
showed that the world was angered by the recently enacted CDA
and its extraterritorial measures.
3. The Resolution of 1993
a. The Cuban Position
In preparation for the vote on November 3, 1993, Cuba
renewed its arguments relating to the CDA's extraterritorial
measures and to alleged U.S. long-standing economic coercion. 2 2 5
One document dealt with extraterritoriality by listing specific
international transactions barred by the Cuban Democracy
Act. 22 6 Another document addressed the issue of coercion by
describing the embargo's harsh impact on Cuba. 22 7 And, in order
to deprive the United States of any countermeasure justification
for the embargo, Cuba challenged the 1992 U.S. claim that Cuba
had illegally nationalized U.S. property. 2 28 Cuba argued that the
nationalization had, instead, been legal and that such
nationalization was supported by a previous resolution.2 2 9

225. For a detailed presentation of Cuba's 1993 position, including
accounts of specific transactions affected by the Cuban Democracy Act and
general information about the state of the Cuban economy, see generally
Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and FinancialEmbargo Imposed by
the U.S. Against Cuba: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
Agenda Item 30, at 7-16, U.N. Doc. A/48/448 (1993) (Cuba's reply to the
Secretary-General's Request for Information, pursuant to the November 1992
Resolution) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General-1992].
226. Letter Dated 18 October 1993 from the Permanent Representative of
Cuba to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., Agenda Item 30, at 4-10, U.N. Doc. A/48/529 (1993).
227. Report of the Secretary-General-1992,supranote 225, at 14-15 (citing
statistics about the harsh effect that the embargo was having on the Cuban
economy).
228. Letter Dated 9 July 1993from the Permanent Representativeof Cuba to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
Item 30 of the Preliminary List, at 2-13, U.N. Doc. A/48/258 (1993) [hereinafter
Letter Dated 9 July] (arguing that Cuba's nationalization of U.S. property was not
illegal).
229. Id. Cuba cited a General Assembly resolution that, though passed
amid a great deal of controversy, stated that nations have a right to nationalize
upon payment of "appropriate" compensation. Id. at 7. Cuba explained that the
United States had rejected bona fide offers of compensation and that the real U.S.
reasons for maintaining the embargo had nothing to do with the nationalization.
Id. at 9-13. For two differing assessments of the Cuban offers of compensation,
compare Shneyer and Barta, supra note 83 (finding the offers quite reasonable)
with Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 861-62 (1962) (stating
that the Cuban offer was not adequate or just).

1995]

EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA

945

After initially touching on the extraterritoriality issue, 230 the
Cuban ambassador's speech presenting the 1993 resolution to the
General Assembly dealt at length with Cuban hardship under the
embargo and with the transparency of U.S. "pretexts" for
maintaining it.2 1 He emphasized that the simple act of lifting the
embargo could bring great assistance to the suffering Cuban
people. 23 2
In closing, he focused on economic coercion,
characterizing the vote as fundamental to the U.N. Charter's
principles concerning all nations' "right to life, independence, and
existence itself."2
The General Assembly
overwhelmingly adopted
the
resolution.
The number of nations voting in favor of the
resolution increased by twenty-nine over the 1992 vote. 2 34 But
again, more significant than the vote tally is an analysis of the
text of the resolution and of nations' explanations of their votes.
b. Language of the Resolution
Most of the 1993 text is exactly the same as the 1992 text,
with the operative section of the resolution similarly calling for a
repeal of laws "referred to in the preamble."2 3 5 Significantly,
however, while the preamble again unmistakably refers to the
CDA, the 1993 preamble also adds some new elements relating
directly to economic coercion and to the long-standing embargo
itself.23 6 In particular, one paragraph mentions a statement

issued by the 1993 Ibero-American Summit concerning the need
to eliminate the use of unilateral economic measures for "political
purposes."237 Another new paragraph expresses concern for the
238
"adverse effects" of the embargo on the Cuban population.
Thus, while still submitting a resolution that focused on calling
for a repeal of the CDA, Cuba succeeded in 1993 in planting a
seed of criticism regarding economic coercion and the longstanding embargo.

230. Id. at 1.
231. Id. at 2-3.
232. Id. at 3.
233. Id. at 4.
234. See Stanley Meisler, U.N. Vote Condemns Embargo Against Cuba, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1994, at A12. (comparing the voting totals in 1992, 1993, and
1994). The General Assembly adopted the 1993 resolution by the large margin of
88 to 4, with 57 abstentions. Id.
235. G.A. Res. 48/16, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 30, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/48/16 (1993).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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c. Positions of other U.N. Members
Although the General Assembly supported Cuba on the
subtle changes in the resolution, individual nations' explanations
of their votes indicated that there had been no significant shift in
opinion.
In fact, the addition of such language against the
embargo cost Cuba the vote of Canada, one of the two major
economic powers that had voted for the resolution in 1992.239 In
explaining his 1993 switch to abstention, the Canadian
ambassador emphasized that the 1992 resolution had focused
solely on the extraterritorial aspects of the embargo. 24° Canada
was not willing, he said, to express an opinion about the primary
embargo, an issue on which it had never commented. 24 1 France
spoke out to stress that its vote for the resolution was again
intended as a denouncement of the illegality of the extraterritorial
law. 24 2 The ambassador pronounced, however, that the French
vote should "in no way be regarded as political support for Cuba"
and its repressive regime. 2 43 Their positions virtually unchanged
since 1992, the representative of the EC 244 and the representative
of Japan 2 45 again refused to criticize the long-standing embargo.
In sum, the text of the 1993 resolution contained evidence of
a subtle attempt by Cuba to tie criticism of economic coercion and
the primary embargo to the world's nearly unanimous criticism of
the CDA's extraterritoriality. While the 1993 resolution attracted
a greater number of votes than did the resolution of 1992, the
positions of individual nations remained virtually the same. Most
importantly, the positions of the world's economic powers were
unchanged. 24 6 Once again, there was no evidence of any postCold War movement toward a norm prohibiting the use of
economic coercion; nor was there any significant increase in
criticism of the long-standing embargo itself.

239.
48th Plenary Meeting-1993, supra note 169, at 10 (statement of the
Canadian ambassador).
240. Id.
241.
Id.
242. Id. at 12 (statement of the French ambassador).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 10 (statement of the Belgian ambassador, on behalf of the EC).
245. Id. at 13 (statement of the Japanese ambassador).
246.
Cf.Sloan-1988, supranote 102, at 130-131 (stating that a meaningful
General Assembly opinion should include the support of those nations whose
support is necessary for effective implementation); Schacter, supra note 109, at 3
(similarly stating that the value of a General Assembly declaration will be
diminished if it is not observed by the states particularly affected).
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4. The Resolution of 1994

a. The Cuban Position.
After Cuban representatives fully explained Cuba's position in
in September 1994,247 the Cuban ambassador
document
a
presented the 1994 resolution to the General Assembly on
October 26.248 First appealing to member nations' right to free
trade and navigation, 24 9 he later emphasized Cuban hardship
under the embargo25 0 and Cuban pride in thirty-five years of
independence from the United States. 25 ' Thus, the bulk of the
speech again dealt with the long-standing embargo and economic
coercion, closing with a rallying call to "all those who, small
their
defend
striving to
are
they may be,
though
" 25 2
independence.
Language of the Resolution and Positions of Other U.N.
b.
Members
Even though the text of the 1994 resolution contained
virtually the same message as that of the 1993 resolution, 25 3 the

Necessity of Ending the ,onomic, Commercial and FinancialEmbargo
247.
Imposed by the U.S. Against Cuba: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR,
49th Sess., at 4-17, U.N. Doc. A/49/398 (1994) (Secretary-General's report,
compiling responses of governments, pursuant to the 1993 resolution). The

Cuban statement compiles an extensive list of third states' trade that has been
affected by the Cuban Democracy Act, and goes on to describe the cost of the
embargo on the Cuban people. Id. at 5-17. It also reiterates Cuban arguments
about the legitimacy of its nationalizations of property and about the illegality of
the U.S. intervention in Cuban affairs. Id.
248. 45th Plenary Meeting-1994, supra note 178, at 1-4 (statement of the
Cuban ambassador).
249. Id. at 1.
250. Id. at 2-3.
251. Id. at 3 (describing Cuban sovereignty as "a sacred right which we will
never renounce").
252. Id. at4.
253. G.A. Res 49/9, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 24, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/4
(1994). Again, much of the text dealt with extraterritoriality and reiterated the
call for a repeal of measures "referred to in the preamble." Id. But again, the
preamble contained some noteworthy language referring to the primary embargo,
beyond the language that unmistakably referred to the CDA. For example, the
fourth preambular paragraph takes note of a Decision of the Latin American
Economic System, dated June 3, 1994, which plainly calls for a lifting of the
embargo. Id. The seventh preambular paragraph repeats concerns first stated in
the 1993 resolution about the "adverse effects of such measures on the Cuban
people." Id. Interestingly, the paragraph referring to the Ibero-American Summit,
which in 1993 had clearly condemned economic coercion used by one state
against another for political purposes, see G.A. Res 48/16, supra note 235, only
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number of nations voting in favor of the 1994 resolution increased
by thirteen over the number from 1993.254

The significant

development was that Canada and two European Union (EU)
members switched their 1993 abstentions to votes in favor of the
resolution. 25 5 Apparently, the fact that the resolution contained
some references to the primary embargo, just as it did in 1993,
was no longer enough to prevent their votes in support of the
resolution.
The European Union was now split between
56
abstentions and votes in favor of the resolution. 2
Analysis of nations' explanations of their votes reveals a
substantial similarity to 1993, with some new signs of change.
The Canadian ambassador's explanation emphasized that Canada
still objected to the extraterritorial provisions and remained
bothered by Cuba's human rights record and democratic
development. 25 7 The statement broke new ground, however, by
including an opinion that the proper post-Cold War strategy
should involve engaging Cuba, not isolating it.2 5 8 While the new
1994 statement by the EU representative was quite similar to the
1993 statement, in 1994 the EU representative expressed a
measured level of concern for the hardship of the embargo on the
Cuban population-decidedly measured, as it was followed by an
assertion that the main cause of Cuban hardship is Cuba's

referred to measures that "affect the free flow of trade" in the 1994 resolution. In
sum, the resolution's operative section again did no more than call for a repeal of
the CDA; but the preamble included noteworthy undercurrents of criticism of
economic coercion.
254.
Meisler, supra note 234 (reporting the overall voting results and the
votes of many individual nations). The 1994 resolution was overwhelmingly
approved by a vote of 101 to 2, with 48 abstentions.
255.
See id.. The EU members referred to are Denmark and Luxembourg.
Id. Note that the name of the European Community was changed to European
Union in 1994. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS: 1995, 844 (Robert
Famighetti, ed., 1994).
256.
France, along with Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, and
Spain voted in favor of the resolution. Great Britain, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Portugal abstained. Josh Friedman, U.S. Embargo of Cuba
Scorned in Big U.N. Vote, NEWSDAY, Oct. 27, 1994, at A15. Russia, accompanied by
Ukraine and Belarus, also switched its 1993 abstention to a 1994 vote in favor of
the resolution, Meisler, supra note 234 (providing Russia's explanation of its
1994 vote, which was substantially similar to its 1993 explanation). 45th Plenary
Meeting-1 994, supranote 178, at 13 (statement of the Russian ambassador).
257.
45th PlenaryMeeting-1994, supra note 178, at 14-15 (statement of the
Canadian ambassador).
258. Id. This Canadian criticism seemed to be based on purely political
concerns about the best way to bring about reform in Cuba, not on legal
principles. Also, some Canadian investors surely have a financial interest in
having U.S. dollars flow back into Cuba.
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political and economic system. 25 9 Thus, the EU's statement again
stopped short of directly criticizing the primary embargo.
Overall, the significant development in the 1994 vote was
Canada's shift from simply condemning the controversial CDA
provisions to criticizing the long-standing embargo. 2 60 Arguably,
the Canadian position may represent the Western seed of a postCold War rejection of the legality of economic coercion. 2 6 1 Yet,
the Canadian ambassador merely stated a belief about the proper
post-Cold War foreign policy strategy and did not speak about any
legal norm.2 6 2 Thus, in view of the carefully circumscribed
statements of the European Union, which decline to even criticize
the long-standing embargo, there appears to be precious little
fertile Western ground in which such a seed can, at present, take

root.
C. No Significant Movement Toward a Norm ProhibitingEconomic

Coercion
Although the United States is suffering unprecedented
isolation due to the controversial measures of the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992, the status of a legal norm prohibiting
economic coercion remains virtually unchanged. The views of the
nonaligned and developing nations have not altered: they have
long considered economic coercion to be illegal. On the other
hand, developed nations have explicitly stated that their votes
protested the CDA's extraterritoriality, not any sort of economic
coercion. Canada admittedly changed its position to a degree in

259. Id. at 12 (statement of the German ambassador, on behalf of the EU).
No doubt, France instigated this criticism of the embargo. A month earlier,
French President Mitterand had said that the embargo was unjust. Charles
Trueheart, U.S. Hard-line Stance on Cuba Draws Icy Reviews From Trading
Partners,WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1994, at A18. The French criticism seemed to be
based on a moral, as opposed to a legal, norm. Id.
260.
Other criticism of the embargo itself was again led by Indonesia,
speaking on behalf of the nonaligned nations. 45th Plenary Meeting-1994, supra
note 178, at 6. The Indonesian ambassador's 1994 comments concerned "the
inapplicability of unilateral economic measures directed against other states for
politically motivated reasons." Id. Mexico, in voting against the United States for
the third year in a row, also stated that pressure by one country on another is not
proper. Id. at 5-6.
261.
In 1993, Norway also spoke out against the use of unilateral sanctions
and voted in favor of the Cuban resolution, stating that legitimate sanctions must
go through the United Nations. Id. at 14. Norway was scheduled to become a
new member of the European Union, along with Sweden and Finland, in January
1995, but Norway voted "no" in a November 1994 referendum, and thus remains
outside the European Union. Lars Foyen, Tension Among Nordics After Sweden,
Finland Join EU, REUIERS, Jan. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,

Cumws File.
262.

Id. at 14 (statement of the Canadian ambassador).
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1994. But from 1991-1994, the EU continued to characterize the
embargo as a purely bilateral issue. That EU stance, despite two
years of frustration over U.S. refusal to back away from the
controversial CDA provisions, strongly indicates that there has
been no movement by the world's economic powers toward
consensus on a legal norm prohibiting economic coercion. 2 63

VI. THE UTILITY AND IMPACT OF THE EMBARGO IN LIGHT OF WORLD
ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

Although the legality of the embargo may not have varied in
the post-Cold War period, the embargo's utility and impact have
been changing. Supporters of continuing the embargo can claim
that despite the embargo's lack of success over the past three
decades, its efficacy has been restored with the fall of
communism. 26 4
As Representative Torricelli pointed out in
September 1994, the Soviet Union's massive aid helped to negate
the embargo's effects for most of the previous thirty-five years. 2 65
Indeed, data presented in this section shows that the Cuban
economy is feeling a renewed post-Cold War pinch. Castro,
however, is also beginning to undermine the effectiveness of the
U.S. embargo by opening up the economy to other sources of
foreign trade and investment.
A. Economic Pinch

Soon after communism began to crumble in Eastern Europe,
the Soviet subsidy to Cuba was cut and aid was scaled back. In
1990 Castro was forced to institute his "special period in time of
peace" to ration food, fuel, and electricity. 2 66

In Cuba today,

there are shortages of everything from food to soap, and power
blackouts are common. 2 67 In a visit to Cuba in September 1994,

263. Like the EU, the world's other economic powers show no such
movement Japan's statements in the General Assembly have never even come
close to criticizing the embargo. See supra text accompanying notes 224, 245.
Canada's statements, though critical, do not involve legal criticism. See supra
text accompanying notes 257-62.
264. Such a rebirth is important, because embargoes normally have their
greatest impact immediately after they are imposed. DOXEY, supra note 48, at
110-111 (citing J. Galtung, On the Effects of InternationalEconomic Sanctions with
Examplesfrom the Case of Rhodesia, 19 WORLD POLMCS 409 (1967)).
265. Torricelli, supranote 9.
266. See Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 21, at 107 (discussing various
shortages); see also FRANKLIN, supra note 26, at 251 (providing a chronology of
events in Cuba).

267.

PlanningHelps Ease Travel Effort, supranote 76.
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former U.S. Senator and presidential candidate, George McGovern
remarked that Cuba was in the worst shape that he had seen at
268
any time during the past twenty years.
A great deal of the problem can be traced directly to Cuba's
loss of Socialist bloc subsidies of its sugar economy. In 1989, the
socialist Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)
bought Cuban sugar at the price of 642 pesos per ton while
nations with market economies paid 214 pesos per ton. 2 69 Given
the high volume of COMECON purchases, the average price that
2 70
Cuba received for its sugar in 1989 was 550 pesos per ton.
After premium prices and, to a lesser extent, volume
purchases 2 7 1 were phased out, the impact on the Cuban economy
began to snowball. Cuba's overall import capacity was cut from
8.1 billion pesos in 1989 to 2.2 billion pesos in 1992.272 Since
intermediate and capital goods made up ninety percent of Cuban
imports in 1989, there were no consumer goods to sacrifice. With
a shortage of inputs-including fuel, fertilizer, herbicides, and
spare parts-Cuban sugar production itself dropped from 8.2
million tons in 1989/90 to four million tons in 1993/94.273 Poor

268.
Micheline Maynard, Cuba Seeks Partners/U.S. Fins Ready to Tap
Opportunity,USA TODAY, DEC. 27, 1994, at lB.
269.
Pollitt and Hagelberg, supra note 22, at 565 (providing statistics about
the Cuban sugar economy). Premium prices in 1987 meant that one ton of Cuban
sugar brought Cuba 4.5 tons of Soviet crude oil; by 1992, one ton of sugar
brought only 1.8 tons of oil. Id.
270. Id.
271.
Central and Eastern European purchases 'declined significantly, from
1.2 million tons in 1989 to 0.16 million tons in 1992. Id. The larger ex-Soviet
market, however, remained essentially steady in terms of volume, importing 3.4
million tons in 1992. Id. The real impact on Cuba was the elimination of the
highly subsidized price paid by COMECON purchasers. Id. Indeed, because of
poor harvest, Cuba was unable to maintain the agreed level of deliveries to Russia
Killen, supra note 39.
Thus, Russia
under a 1994 deal of sugar for oil.
temporarily halted the return flow of oil. Id. By 1995, the Soviets had again
begun to supply oil to Cuba, upon Cuba's agreement to make up the sugar deficit
in early 1995. Id.
The U.S. State
272. Pollitt and Hagelberg, supra note 22, at 565.
Department similarly emphasizes that Cuban foreign trade had fallen 75% since
the end of the Soviet Union's six billion dollar annual subsidy. Update-1994,

supra note 1, at 752; see also Maynard, supra note 268 (reporting that Cuban
exports have dropped from $6.5 billion in 1985 to $1.7 billion in 1994, with
imports dropping from $8.8 billion in 1985 to $2.3 billion in 1994).
273. For the figures for 1989/90 through 1992/93, see Pollitt and
Hagelberg, supranote 22, at 565-67. For the 1993/94 figures, see Frances Kerry,
Cuba Says Sugar Industry Openfor Foreign Capital, REUIER'S EUR. BUS. REP., Oct.
31, 1994. Although the major drop-off in production was from seven million tons
in 1991/92 to 4.2 million in 1992/92, Pollitt and Hageberg, supra note 22, at
565-66, there was still a decline from 4.2 million to the four million ton level in
1993/94. Kerry, supra.
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management of the scarce inputs worsened matters. 2 74 The
1993/94 level of production represented the worst harvest since
1918.275 Experts predict another dismal four million ton harvest
for 1995.276 As a result, in 1994, Castro announced that the
sugar industry would open to foreign investment, with the goal of
27 7
boosting output,back up to six or seven million tons.
Just as proponents of the Cuban Democracy Act had hoped,
the absence of communist bloc subsidies has sent the Cuban
economy into a terrible tailspin. Overall, the Cuban economy has
declined forty to fifty percent since 1990, after a mere three
percent decline during the 1980s. 278 Unemployment rates are
thirty percent or higher. 2 7 9 These numbers attest to the hardship
that George McGovern witnessed during his September 1994
visit. 25 0 In 1994 the Cuban economy showed no real growth and
seemed to hit bottom, yet a small glimmer of hope appeared as
28 1
further declines were avoided.
B. ForeignInvestment in Cuba
The problem for embargo proponents is that Castro has
begun serious economic reform. That reform has gone beyond
28 2
internal changes, such as allowing private farmers markets

Carlos Lage, the Cuban Vice-President in charge of economic reforms,
reported that the harvests of 1992/93 and 1993/94 had been conducted with
just 22% of the technical input of previous years. Id.
274. Pollitt and Hagelberg, supra note 22, at 566.
275. Update-1994, supra note 1, at 752.
276. The Doors Inch Open In Castro's Cuba, supra note 2, at 45.
277. Foreign Investment Helping, Castro Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at
D4 (discussing Castro's new attitude about the need for foreign investment
throughout the Cuban economy).
278. A December 1994 report of the U.N. Economic Commission on Latin
America states that the Cuban economy contracted by 42% from 1990 to 1993.
Cuba's Economy Hits Bottom, May Be Recovering-U.N., supra note 21. Maynard,
supranote 268, reports that Cuban GNP has plunged by 50% since 1990.
279. Maynard, supra note 268 (reporting that adult unemployment is 30%).
The State Department claims that underemployment and unemployment may be
as high as 40%. Update-1994, supranote 1, at 752.
280. See note 268 and accompanying text.
281. Cuba's Economy Hits Bottom, May Be Recovering-U.N., supra note 21
(presenting figures from the U.N. Economic Commission on Latin America).
Tourism, mining, and construction all showed growth. Id. Tourism was able to
overtake the sugar industry as Cuba's greatest source of income, since sugar and
agriculture posted declines. Id.
282. Micheline Maynard, Farmers' Markets Are Big Success/Relaxed Rules
Ease Shortages, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 1994, at 2B. As of October 1994, farmers
were permitted to sell part of their produce at deregulated prices at these farmers
markets instead of being forced to sell all to the state. See Foreign Investment
Helping, Castro Says, supra note 277. In an interview published in February
1995, Castro said that about 20% of farm production has since been sold at the
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and, over the past two years, has involved opening up all
industries on the island to foreign investment. 28 3 Castro himself
has come to an understanding that foreign investment is the only
thing that can help revive his faltering economy. 2 84 Thus, in
January 1995, Cuban Vice-President Lage even spoke at the

Davos World Economic Forum-a gathering of top business and

political leaders, which Cuba would have scorned just a few years
ago-to

encourage foreign investors to partake in

Cuba's bright

28 5

future.
An increasing number of foreign investors seem to agree with

Mr. Lage's positive assessment of Cuba's future. 28 60 Companies
291
from Mexico,

28 7

Canada,

288

Spain,

28 9

29

Great Britain,

France,

farmers markets. Id. He estimated that the amount of goods sold on the
deregulated market could amount to as much as 30-40% in the future, but he
emphasized the need for the state to keep a portion to distribute it evenly. Id.
See generally, ForeignInvestment Helping, Castro Says, supra note 277
283.
(presenting the Cuban leader's views on reform).
284.
Id.
285.
Robert Evans, Cuba Bids for Foreign Investment, REUTERS'S EUR. BUS.
REP., Jan. 29, 1995. The World Economic Forum (WEF) is a private sector club
that was started in 1971 by Swiss business school professor Klaus Schwab.
Catherine Ong, More Than Just Another Meeting at Top Guns, BUSINESS TIMES, Jan.
25, 1995, at 6. Mr. Schwab originally hoped to get European business leaders
together to learn about the advanced skills of U.S. management. Id. This
intellectual summit has grown so much that the gathering at Davos, Switzerland
on January 26-31 involved 200 ministers of cabinet rank, including 30 heads of
states, plus 850 world business leaders representing companies with annual
sales of $4 trillion. Catherine Ong, A Marketplacefor Ideas That Shape the World,
BUSINESS TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at 6. Participants, who may attend by invitation
only, set priorities for government and business for the upcoming year. Id.
Among those invited to participate in 1995 were U.S. President Clinton (via live
satellite), U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, filmmaker Oliver Stone,
media tycoon Rupert Murdoch, and various other international bankers and
entrepreneurs. Id.
286.
A recent report from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a division of
the London publisher of The Economist, claims that investment opportunities in
Cuba could turn into a "gold rush." Charles Lunan, Foreign Firms PourMoney Into
Cuba, Book Says; But Miami Writer Finds Little of Interest to U.S. Investors, SUNSENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Jan. 27, 1995, at 8B, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (describing the EIU report); Cuba is Opening for Business,
BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 26, 1995 (describing the EIU report).
287. Mexico has been the key investor, acquiring interests in Cuban
industries including telecommunications, cement, tourism, and oil refining.
ForeignInvestment Helping, Castro Says, supranote 277.
288. Six Canadian firms are currently involved in a joint venture, formed in
1993, for mining Cuban nickel. Id.; see also Reese Erlich, Push To Lift Embargo
Gains Momentum in Some Circles, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 23, 1993, at 9
(discussing the start-up of the Canadian joint venture). More recently, Canadian
chemical-maker Sherritt and brewer Labatt have invested in Cuba. Lunan, supra
note 286.
289. By 1993, a Spanish tourism company had already invested $78 million
in three Cuban hotels. Erlich, supra note 288, at 9. Today that investment
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and Australia 2 92 have all begun to invest in Cuba and to support
its development. Some of the foreign governments themselves
have begun to reach out to Cuba with aid. Speaking out against
the embargo strategy, Canada agreed to grant Cuba one million
Canadian dollars (U.S.$720,000) in aid in June 1994.293

Similarly, after French President Mitterand criticized the embargo

as "unjust,"294 France agreed in January 1995 to increase the
amount of export credits available to Havana to 750 million francs
(nearly U.S.$140 million).2 95 Another source of aid is Russia,

which continues to supply Cuba with $200 million per year to

2 96
maintain an electronic spy station on the island.
Great Britain also signed an Investment Promotion and
Protection Agreement with Cuba in January 1995.297 In the
agreement, which protects existing and future investment in
Cuba, Britain pledged advice and monetary assistance for smallscale development projects.2 9 8 At the signing, the British Minister
of Trade and Technology declared Britain's intent to help Cuba
achieve a transition to a market-oriented economy. 2 99 By early
February 1995, a large British trade delegation had traveled to
Cuba.S° ° According to reports, a British sugar trade house agreed

seems wise, since tourism overtook sugar in 1994 to become the biggest incomegenerating industry for Cuba.
See Cuba's Economy Hits Bottom, May Be
Recovering-U.N., supranote 21.
290. The British currently have two firms, Premier and British Borneo,
involved in oil exploration, while an Anglo-Dutch firm, Unilever, set up a joint
venture in 1994 with the Cuban state-owned soap and detergent firm. Frances
Kerry, Cuba, Britain EnthusiasticAbout Business Prospects, REUTERS EUR. BUS.
REP., Feb 8, 1995.
291.
Lunan, supra note 286 (noting the recent investment of the French
distiller Pernod Ricard).
292. Id. (noting the recent investment of Australia's Western Mining).
293.
Craig Turner, Canada Ends Moratorium with $1 Million in Aid to Cuba,

L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1994 at A4; Canada Will Restore Aid to Cuba, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, June 20, 1994.
294.
See Trueheart, supra note 259 (discussing Canada's differences with
U.S. policy).
295.
Cuba's Lage Reaches Economic Agreements in France, REbIJER EUR.
BUS. REP., Jan. 31, 1995. France is Cuba's biggest European trading partner. Id.
296.
In February 1995, the U.S. Congress began to seriously consider
cutting aid to Russia because of the $200 million in military aid to Cuba. See
Juan J. Walter, One-Rvo PunchHits Russian Aid Plan, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 1995,
at 4A; see also, Daniel Williams, Helms Offers Tough Anti-Castro Bill, WASH. PoSr.,
Feb. 10, 1995, atA31.
297.
UK, Cuba Sign Investment Promotion,ProtectionDeal, REUrERS, January
30, 1995.
298.
Id.
299.
Id.
300.
British politician Baroness Young-chair of the recently launched
"Cuba initiative"--led a 40-member trade delegation to visit Castro to discuss
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to finance much-needed inputs for Cuba's troubled sugar
industry.3 0 1
Many U.S. investors would like to join their Canadian, Latin
American, and European counterparts.
Although U.S. finns
cannot invest in Cuban businesses at this point, the potential
investment jackpots in the Cuban sugar3° 2 and tourism3 3
industries have naturally sparked interest. Former Chairman of
Chrysler Motors Corporation, Lee lacocca, now in
the
entertainment business, even traveled to Cuba in July 1994 for
3°4
investment talks with Castro.
Further, Cuba needs everything from infrastructure and
agricultural equipment to everyday consumer and food
products. 30 5 U.S. finms know that once the embargo is lifted,
30 6
assistance will flow to Cuba to remedy the current lack of cash.
Thus, sixty-nine U.S. firms have signed letters of intent with
Cuba to give them an inside track on Cuban investment when the
embargo ends. 30 7
Others are investing now in non-Cuban
industries that promise to flourish once the embargo is lifted.3 0 8
Not surprisingly, some are growing impatient and are lobbying
Congress for change.3 0 9 Some commentators believe that U.S.

developing closer ties with the British private sector. Kerry, supra note 290.
Cuban officials were encouraged by British interest in tourism and mining. Id.
301. Id. (the company mentioned was E.D. and F. Mann).
302. The agricultural firm Archer-Daniels-Midland is reportedly ready to
step into Cuban sugar cane production. Maynard, supranote 268.
303. Carlson, the company behind Radisson Hotels and T.G.I. Friday
restaurants, is actively lobbying Congress to lift the embargo. Id. Peter Blyth,
executive vice-president of Carlson, predicts that Cuba may quickly become a top
destination of U.S. travelers. Id.

304. See U.S. Firms, Cuba Turn an Eye Toward Ending 30-Year Freeze; But
the Clinton Administration'sInsistence on Reform Makes Imminent Change Unlikely,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at D5; and Maynard, supranote 268.
305. Jim McTague, Castro Watch: U.S. Business Fondly Looks Toward
Castro'sFuture, BARRON'S, June 6, 1994, at 40 (noting that products of all kind
will be needed on the island); see also Maynard, supra note 268 (providing a list of
over 25 U.S. companies that Cuba is eager to have on the island).
306. McTague, supranote 305.
307. Maynard, supra note 268; see also Kerry, supra note 273 (discussing
U.S. business letters of intent in Cuba).
308. Sara Callian, U.S. Investors Are Catching Cuba Fever, But Some Pros
Advise PlayingIt Cool, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1994, at CI. One new mutual fund is
attracting interest as it trades on the NASDAQ stock market under the name of
CUBA. Id. The fund has investments in firms like Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,
that could profit from a lifting of the embargo. Id. Other investors have shown
interest in companies in Florida and Puerto Rico that could easily branch out into
Cuba. Id. The article notes, however, that some experienced investors believe
that the interest in Cuba is premature. Id.
309. U.S. entrepreneurs met with Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) during the
spring of 1994 to express concern about foreign inroads into the Cuban market.
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3 10
businesses will be the force for change in the embargo policy.

C. The Big Picture

Today, the Cuban economy remains in terrible shape.
Although a total of $1.5 billion of foreign investment flowed to
Cuba in 1994, it was limited to only a few sectors and,
3 11
realistically, may not be enough to revive the economy.
Despite the rise in foreign investment, domestic dissatisfaction is
still a problem for Castro.
When frustration mounted over
shortages of food, electricity, and public transportation,3 12 Castro
faced, on August 5, 1994, the largest public demonstration since
he took power in 1959.313 In response, Castro has deployed
increased numbers of uniformed and plainclothes police
officers. 3 14 In addition, he has pressed forward with further
3 15
economic reforms.

McTague, supra note 305. For further examples of lobbying by U.S. firms to lift
the embargo, see Maynard, supra note 268 (Carlson hotel/restaurant vicepresident lobbying Congress); Erlich, supranote 288 (describing, as of June 1993,
an organization of 50 small- and mid-sized businesses, called the Association for
Free Trade With Cuba).
310. For a well-reasoned opinion that business interests within the United
States will ultimately force a change in U.S. policy, see Saul Landau and Diana
Starratt, Cuba's Economic Slide, MULINAIONAL MONrrOR, Nov. 1994, at 12. See
also Maynard, supra note 268 (noting that U.S. businesses helped to convince
U.S. officials to open relations with China, Russia, North Korea, and, most
recently, Vietnam).
311.
The Doors Inch Open In Castro'sCuba, supranote 2, at 45.
312.
See supra Part VI-A.
313.
See notes 2-6 and accompanying text. The August 5th demonstration
is considered the worst since the 1959 revolution. Update-1994, supra note 1, at
752; The Doors Inch Open in Castro's Cuba, supra note 2, at 45.
Hundreds or
possibly thousands of youths in Havana threw stones at police and ransacked
stores. Tim Golden, A Year After Boat Exodus, Threat to Castro Disspates, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at Al.
314.
Golden, supra note 313. Thousands of police were stationed at the site
of the 1994 riot as the anniversary was commemorated with a march organized by
Castro. Id. In the summer of 1995, Castro's deployment of an increased police
presence contributed to a more subdued atmosphere in Cuba. See id. The
desperation of 1994 had "increasingly given way to resignation." Id. Additionally,
Castro's efforts at reform, see supra Part VI-B, have led to some visible
improvements, such as farmers markets and shorter lines for public
transportation, and have led Cuban officials to boast that the worst is over for the
economy.
Id.
Whether any long-term political stability and economic
improvement will result remains to be seen.
315.
See Castro Takes One More Step Toward Capitalism,ECONOMIST, Sept.
9, 1995, at 45 (discussing a new Cuban law, passed September 5, 1995, which
allows foreigners to own 100% of enterprises in Cuba, abolishing the former 50%
limit). The article, however, notes that a "big reason" for the new law is that
foreign investment, estimated by Cuba at less than $2 billion, has been less than
Castro would have liked. Id. U.S. investment remains the key. Id. at 45-46.
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Will foreign investment eventually turn the Cuban economy
Will U.S.
around and allow Castro to consolidate power?
businesses successfully lobby for a change in Cuban policy? Or
will social unrest build and force Castro to capitulate? Only time

will provide the answers to these questions. What is clear is that

U.S. policy makers are growing increasingly frustrated by foreign
pressure
economic support of the Castro regime 3 16 and are3 feeling
17
at home from U.S. businesses to lift the embargo.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to this writer's initial hypothesis and to indications
in the popular press,3 18 the recent U.N. votes concerning the
embargo provide no evidence that the post-Cold War international
community has moved toward a consensus on a norm prohibiting
the unilateral use of economic coercion. Given the largely positive
nature of international law,3 1 9 one explanation for this reality is
simple: as long as inequality in terms of economic power persists,
the economically powerful have little incentive to sign a treaty or
320
engage in state practice that explicitly recognizes such a norm.

316.
In September 1994, Senator Bob Dole (R.-Kan.) complained that the
United States is not going to be able to bring down Castro without some
international cooperation. Trueheart, supra note 259, Senator Dole specifically
criticized Canada for its lack of cooperation. Id. On February 9, 1995, Senator
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)-Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee-proposed
legislation to reduce U.S. aid to Russia by the $200 million that it currently sends
Cuba in military aid. See Helms Offers Tough Anti-CastroBill, supranote 296. In
January 1995, Representative Peter Deutsch (D-Fla.) demanded that legislation to
aid Mexico through its urgent financial crisis be tied to an ending of Mexico's
trade relations with Cuba. William Scally, Focus:Mexico Aid Plan Said in Trouble,
REUIERS, Jan. 28, 1995; see also Bill Montague and Juan Walter, Feuding May
Stall Loans to Mexico, USA TODAY, Jan. 19, 1995, at 1B (discussing objections to
the loan package).
317.
See supra note 302-10 and accompanying text.
318.
The initial hypothesis was that the post-Cold War international
community, feeling more safe and secure, might be moving toward agreement on
a norm prohibiting the use of economic coercion. For a discussion of the press'
treatment of the recent U.N. activity, see supranote 206.
319.
See supra note 84 (discussing the dominance of positivism in
international law today).
320.
Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 195 (2ND ED. 1961) (explaining
that the given fact of approximate equality among individuals makes obvious to
those individuals the necessity of engaging in a system of law and morality); id. at
198 (explaining that inequality among individuals results in agreement on only
It follows from Hart that when there is inequality among
minimal rules).
individuals, as there is in the international arena, the stronger will not as readily
perceive the necessity of engaging in a system of law and morality. Hart hints, in
his 1961 publication, that the traditional inequality in the international arena
may be changing. Id. at 195. But, the very fact that in 1995 economic coercion
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The numerous commentators who have endeavored to simply
define illegal economic coercion seem to overlook that positive law
reality, which is behind the creation of international legal norms.
Recent events surrounding the embargo indicate that rather
than legal changes, the end of the Cold War has brought
important economic changes, including foreign investment and
trade opportunities in previously inaccessible markets like Cuba.
Of course, Castro's new economic reforms represent no personal
change of heart.3 2 1 Deprived of the Soviet bloc's subsidies, Castro
is simply grasping for an alternative lifeline.
Having been
abandoned, Castro is actually in the same position he faced in
1960. But this time his alternative lifeline is based on capitalism
and free markets, instead of on centralized economic planning.
Just as perestroikapreceded the collapse of the Soviet Union, so
will Castro's grudging economic reforms likely erode his power
3 22
and lead, ultimately, to major political change in Cuba.
With respect to U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, the new
economic opportunities there promise to serve as one of the main
engines of change. U.S. businesses are growing increasingly
restless watching the competition enter the Cuban market. U.S.

policy makers must acknowledge that if foreign investment
continues in Cuba, continuing the embargo may become contrary
to U.S. economic interests.
Thus, what the post-Cold War standoff between the United
States and Cuba teaches is that underdeveloped nations stand to
benefit much more from the pursuit of international free trade
than from the pursuit of international legal norms prohibiting
economic coercion.
Richard D. Porotsky*

still harshly impacts developing countries is strong evidence that significant
inequality remains.
321.
As Castro made clear in an interview published in February 1994, he

is opening up the economy, not because he is a capitalist, but because Cuba
"would not have had another way out without this participation of foreign capital."
ForeignInvestment Helping, Castro Says, supranote 277. His iron-fisted control of
human rights and democratic freedoms has not changed. See U.S. Firms, Cuba
Turn an Eye Toward Ending 30-Year Freeze, supranote 304.
322. Cf. Castro Takes One More Step Toward Capitalism, supra note 315
(hinting that Castro, like China in recent days, may soon experience the problem
of "keeping capitalist economics out of communist politics.").
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